In: Statistics and Probability
What Kennan did, in his famous “Long Telegram” from Moscow in
February 1946 and through a briefly anonymous article in
Foreign Affairs in 1947 was to lay out a third path
between the extremes of war and appeasement—containment. Stalin, he
said, is not Hitler. He does not have a fixed timetable for
aggression. He is determined to dominate Europe and, if possible,
the world, but there is no hurry about it. If the US and its allies
could be patient and contain Soviet expansionism without war or
appeasement over a sufficiently long period of time the Russians
would change their priorities. If we could develop a coherent
strategy on non-provocative resistance, this third path would lead
to a settlement with the Soviet Union or even to the break-up of
the Soviet Union. Kennan foresaw internal contradictions within the
Soviet system that would probably cause it to fall apart. The first
major initiative that he proposed was the Marshall Plan, providing
American aid for the recovery of Western Europe so that Europe
would not despair and feel it had to look to the Soviet Union as an
alternative.