In: Accounting
John Exchanging Integrated (JEI), is a subsidiary of Elegance. JEI is a securities trading firm specializing in debt and equity securities transactions mostly traded on the NASDAQ. JEI is listed on NASDAQ. Also, at the request of their customers, JEI will charge a fee to receive or place money transfers from or to accounts all over the world. The minimum fee is $10 for buying or selling stock and $25 for money transfers. The maximum fee is $500,000 for stock transactions and 2% for money transfers. A minimum fee of $100 is also charged for redemptions. To become a customer, simply complete an on-line application and deposit a minimum of $10,000. Customers begin trading immediately. Yong Wei is the CEO of JEI. Yong does not serve on the audit committee of JEI. In January of 2015, Crystal Lee, Director of JEI’s internal audit department, completed an audit of various functions of the company. Part of the audit involved a review of internal controls for the sales, payable and payroll functions including the controls over the authorization of transactions, accounting for transactions, and the protection of assets. The director reported the following issues to Yong Wei:
1. The petty cash custodian confesses to having “borrowed” $9,010 over the last two years. The custodian promises to repay every penny, with interest, as soon as possible.
2. An employee in accounts payable maintains the accounts payable subsidiary ledger.
3. In June of 2015, JEI was notified that their proprietary information would be broadcast on the Internet if they did not pay a $17 million fee. The hacker was caught by the FBI before any damage was done.
4. In November of 2015, JEI customers were notified by e-mail that their accounts had been compromised and were being restricted unless they re-registered using an accompanying hyperlink to a Web page that had JEI’s logo, home page design, and internal links. The form had a place for them to enter their credit card data, ATM PINs, Social Security number, date of birth, and their mother’s maiden name. Due to the diligent efforts of Tommy Lew, JEI customer information was not breach, according to internal sources.
5. When entering a large credit sale, the clerk typed in the customer's account number as 45982 instead of 45892. That account number did not exist. The mistake was not caught until later in the week when the weekly billing process was run. Consequently, the customer was not billed for another week, delaying receipt of payment.
6. A batch of 73 time sheets was sent to the payroll department for weekly processing. Somehow, one of the time sheets did not get processed. The mistake was not caught until payday, when one employee complained about not receiving a paycheck.
7. Attackers broke into the company’s information system through a wireless access point located in one of its trading branches. The wireless access point had been purchased and installed by an office manager without informing central IT or security.
1. Petty cash misappropriation:
Step-A:
Internal control weakness identified:
Step-B:
Recommended internal control:
2. Employee in payable maintains accounts payable subsidiary ledger:
Step-A:
Internal control weakness identified:
Step-B:
Recommended internal control:
3. Identification of hackers:
Internal control strengths noted:
4. Identification of mails sent by unauthorized personnel.
Internal control strength identified:
5. Wrong posting to another account number:
Step-A:
Internal control weakness identified:
Step-B:
Recommended internal control:
6. Payroll processing:
Step-A:
Internal control weakness identified:
Step-B:
Recommended internal control:
7. Intruder in the company’s information systems:
Internal control weakness identified and recommended controls: