In: Economics
Theories matter because they become self fulfilling in certain circumstances and affect behavior. A theory can be self fulfilling only when people become aware of the theory and have the ability to make choices according to its dictates. Social and physical arrangements are also altered on the basis of the theory's prescriptions.
Economics and other social science theories often fulfill these conditions along with implications, not only for the work of scholars but also for testing the theories that can change the world they describe.
It is an honor that Felin and Foss focused on such a long critique of self confirming theories. Nevertheless, we probably do not deserve such undivided attention because the mechanisms through which theories can become self confirming have been the focus of theoretical and empirical analysis by diverse scholars from a spectrum of academic fields.
Every Theory cannot be self-confirming, but some can be F&F both implicitly and explicitly argue that the theories that succeed are the ones that are most veridical with the world as it exists. This position, at least in its extreme form, clashes with the large literature on the sociology of science, beginning with Kuhn (1970). The implications of his work and other, empirical work in the Kuhnian tradition (e.g., Lodahl and Gordon 1972) is that the acceptance of scientific theories is a function of both their truth value and the political and rhetorical skills and power of their proponents and opponents (see, for example, Morrell (2008) for an articulation of this viewpoint with respect to evidence-based management).
1 It is worth noting how F&F, despite their declared allegiance to critical realism (Haack 1998), end up with the argument that are much more akin to 19th century logical positivism. Even Popper (1959) took issue with F&F from an epistemological point of view, because Popper assumed that some theories are true, but we will not necessarily know which ones.
2 With their recourse to ideas such as fundamental human nature, which they seem to believe exists apart from things such as social influence and perhaps even learning, F&F engage the “nature” versus “nurture” debate. The relevant literature concerning this argument is truly vast and includes most of social psychology, sociology, political science, economics, and numerous other fields as well.
In the end, we can conclude that the questions of (a) whether or not theories are self-confirming and (b) the conditions under which they are, as well as (c) the effects of theory on organizations and individuals who come to believe them, are empirical issues.