In: Accounting
Please mentioned below the answer
Dual nature of matter is an important concept in JEE physics and is basically the study of different nature that a matter possesses or exhibits. A matter can either display or have a particle nature or wave nature. Various experiments have further been conducted to prove this theory.
Initially, the properties of matter or light were explained in terms of its particle nature. Corpuscular theory of light, etc. were some of the primitive steps that influenced this. Later on, it was experimentally found out that matter does possess the properties of a wave. Hence, the matter is said to possess dual nature, i.e., it has both the properties of a particle and as well as a wave.
Maxwell’s equation of electromagnetism and Hertz experiments on the generation and detection of electromagnetic waves in 1887 strongly established the wave nature of light.
Thus, the wave-particle duality is an important concept in quantum mechanics which describes that every particle or more specifically quantum entity may be expressed as either a particle or a wave. This concept further helps to modify the inability of the classical mechanic’s approach or theories to fully describe the behaviour of the matter.
Important Topics Covering Dual Nature of Matter
Here are some of the important topics that should be learnt while dealing with this concept.
Electronic Emission
The minimum energy that is required to emit an electron from the surface of a metal can be supplied to the free electrons by either of the methods given below:
Photoelectric Effect
The photoelectric effect is a phenomenon that involves electrons escaping from the surface of materials. Usually, the surface of the material is composed of both positive and negative ions. What happens in the process is when light is made to be incident on the metal surface, some of the electrons which are present near the surface will absorb enough energy from the incident radiation and thus overcomes the attraction of the positive ions. Further, when the electrons gain as much sufficient energy required, they will escape out of the metal surface into the surrounding space. This forms the basis for the Photoelectric effect.
Some related terms include:
It is an intriguing time to write about property rights. During the last quarter of century our understanding of the concept has been challenged following the breakdown of the consensus among legal and economic scholars on the way in which the concept should be defined, understood and interpreted. For almost a century legal and economic scholars have broadly agreed on the fact that property rights characterise the set of legal relations among individuals over the use of resources. According to this interpretation, property rights regimes define the mechanisms regulating the way in which alternative claims and interests over the use of resources can be allocated among the various individuals. This is the essence of the so-called “bundle of rights” (or “bundle of sticks”) approach that represented the undisputed dominant paradigm in both the legal and the economic discipline for nearly a century, and that is conventionally traced back to the works of Hohfeld (1913; 1917).1 This characterization of property rights was in sharp contrast with the earlier classical approach that treated property rights as exclusive dominium of an individual over a thing (the property).2 The transition from the old classical approach to the novel bundle of right approach revealed the inherent dual nature of the property right concept, at times undisputed dominium over a thing (regardless of its use), other times interpersonal interests over the valuable uses of a thing (regardless of who controls it). As summarised by Harris (1996: 4): “Property has a dual function, since it governs both the use of things and the allocation of items of social wealth. It is in this duality of function that its controversiality principally resides.”
It was the “controversiality” and ambiguity of the dual nature of property rights that fostered the breakdown of the general consensus over the bundle of rights approach by the end of the last century in both the legal and the economic discipline. Following the early works of Epstein (1979, 1985), Radin (1982, 1986, 1987) and, especially, the subsequent contributions of legal philosophers such as Harris (1996), Penner (1996; 1997), Merrill (1998) and Rose (1985), the dominant interpretation of property rights as legal relations was challenged in favour of alternative interpretations of property rights more in line with the older classical paradigm, as an individual’s right to enjoy an exclusive and unhampered relationship with a thing vis-à-vis all other members of a society. The common conclusion of these authors was that the bundle of rights’ exclusive focus on the mechanisms governing and regulating the allocation of legal interests over the uses of a property, at the expenses of the mechanisms regulating the way in which individuals can acquire and exercise exclusive control (dominium) over properties, cannot satisfactorily capture the essence of property rights and provides an incorrect interpretation of the dual nature of property rights.3 By the turn of the century the other aspect of the dual nature of the property concept was brought back into the analysis and regained analytical prominence; property rights started to be defined, once again, in terms of physical possession of, and exclusion from, things.
Consistent with the conclusions of the Coase theorem, according to the new informational theory the dual nature of property rights emerges as a result of transaction costs, in the same way in which the dual nature of value and costs (and many other economic variables) becomes relevant whenever transaction costs are positive.4 While the bundle of right approach would always be the optimal way to define property rights in the ideal case of inexistent transaction costs, exclusion strategies become much more efficient in broadcasting information whenever the cost to define, establish and enforce property rights cannot be neglected: in all those situations where transaction costs cannot be negligible, property rights should be intended as rights to things rooted in possession and based on the right to exclude, consistent with the classical approach.
In line with the comparative institutional approach adopted by standard new-institutional economics (Aoki, 2001; Greif, 1998; Williamson, 1991, 1998), the novel economic approach to property law is at the same time a normative, a predictive, and explanatory theory of comparative property rights regimes, as “[i]t helps explain the structures we do not find, shows how property can be used to maximize option value, and demonstrates why innovation in property takes the institutional paths it does” (Smith, 2012a: 1702).
Economists debate whether changing the way in which property rights are defined in case of positive transaction costs (as in rem rights to exclude) makes any difference to the substance of the argument or whether it is just a mere semantic and language quibble not worth of too much attention, given that it leaves the Coasean core argument completely untouched (in fact, it reinforces it). 9 In their view, rights in rem, property rules, and economic property rights are different expressions to convey the same message and characterise the same concept: the individual’s “natural” subjective valuation and free choice.