Question

research about the Labour market in Bahrain and explain how it differs from other countries the business is already halfing its operations in terms of the workforce demographics, hiring of expatriates. You may choose another International country to compare Bahrain with. You must find out in relevance to the tight and loose labor market conditions and how Covid 19 has an impact on the labor trends.

highlight the government initiatives in these countries in terms of, Nationalization and its implications on recruitment. Is there a role for Tamkeen to play?

Answer 1

Labour market in Bahrain and explain how it differs from other countries

The first discovery of oil within the Arab Peninsula happened in Bahrain, in 1932. Previous seasonal migration linked to pearl exploitation was rapidly replaced by inflows of workers from Western countries, Iran, British India, and therefore the other Gulf States like Oman. In spite of such an extended history of labour migration to the country, foreign residents didn't outnumber Bahraini citizens until the top of the 2000s. By then, oil reserves had considerably reduced and therefore the Kingdom was one among the three least wealthy GCC countries.

From the beginning of Bahrain’s oil exploitation, migration flows of workers to the country took on particular political stakes. Unemployed Bahraini nationals were to be hired in priority for vacant posts in the nascent oil industry; but their lack of experience within the field enticed Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO) to resort instead to employing skilled and cheap Iranian labourers. However, for fear that these labour migration patterns would encourage Iran’s claims over Bahrain, British Protectorate authorities and Bahrain’s ruling family Al-Khalifa supported the recruitment of Indian skilled and semiskilled professionals. An economic rationale thus confronted political concerns within the management of foreign labour. Additionally, Bahraini workers who were filling rock bottom paid position at rock bottom of the occupational ladder launched labour protests as early as 1938 and 1954-56. They also formed labour unions, excluding from it the foreign labourers who were viewed as “adjuncts of the Western powers at add the country”. From the primary population census conducted in 1941 to Bahrain’s independence in 1971, the share of non-nationals remained constant at around 20 per cent. From the mid-1970s and therefore the oil-boom to the first 2000s, the numbers of foreign nationals surged to a 3rd of the entire population. Arab labourers were progressively replaced by Asians, and semi-skilled and skilled expatriates from earlier waves (among who were many Indians) were outnumbered by lowskilled, manual workers. The fragmentation of the workforce also increased with the segmentation of the labour market between a Bahraini-(over)staffed governmental sector – including industrial joint ventures like BAPCO and ALBA, the aluminium company– and a personal sector employing foreign workers in detrimental conditions. The oil slump of the 1980s and 1990s and therefore the ensuing contraction of the public sector led to mounting levels of unemployment among young Bahrainis.

In such a dire situation and also thanks to its limited oil resources, Bahrain decided to start a strong and fast economic liberalisation process. Its economy diversified and expanded into banking and finance, heavy industries and manufacturing, retail, and tourism. Fuelled by the hike in oil prices after 2003, development policies followed “a blueprint that envisions Bahrain because the progressive hub of finance and repair industries within the Gulf, a beacon of modernity within the region, and a tourist attraction constructed round the city as a site of consumption.Mega-real estate projects” directed at expatriates,especially, contributed to the development boom within the country.

Such economic achievements were also facilitated by increasing flows of foreign workers. the last decade witnessed a doubling of the entire resident population within the Kingdom and almost a trebling of the number of foreign residents. This seems in contradiction with the main reform of Bahrain’s labour market launched in 2004, which aimed toward alleviating nationals’ massive unemployment. The policy was based on erasing the segmentation of labour between nationals and expatriates by fully liberalising the labour market and on curbing immigration by equalizing the value of employing nationals and expatriates. The Labour Market Regulation Authority (LMRA) was established in May 2006 and mandated with regulating and controlling work permits for expatriate employees and therefore the self-employed, additionally to issuing licenses for the workforce and recruitment agencies. so as to enforce real competition between nationals and expatriates and thus improve work conditions and wages within the private sector, Bahrain loosened the kafala (sponsorship) system in August 2009 by abolishing the mandatory No Objection Certificate hampering expatriates’ professional mobility. However, employers opposed this modest move, and since mid-2009, a replacement law restricts the switching of kafeel (sponsor) without the latter’s consent to those having spent one full year with their sponsor. In Bahrain, like elsewhere within the Gulf, reform of the management of foreign labour is that the subject of serious domestic political tensions As a matter of fact, the “natives” vs “foreigners” and migration issues produce other political implications within the country. Ever since the time of British rule, foreigners were hired within the army and police in order to avoid risks of collusion with locals. However, one among the stress of the demonstrators since the beginning of the uprisings in February 2011 has been to place an end to naturalisation that might impact the communal makeup of the Bahraini population.

Hiring of expatriates

Mid-2014, estimates of Bahrain’s population stood at 1,314,562 persons, of whom 638,818 (52 per cent) were foreign nationals the amount of foreign residents rose rapidly during the 2000s and nonnationals accounted for up to 54 per cent of the entire population in 2010. Since then, however, a slight decrease within the numbers of non-Bahrainis could also be noted. In mid-2013, 509,622 persons or 79.8 per cent of the foreign residents were employed,ma king up 77 per cent of the entire employed population in the Kingdom. Unlike in other GCC states, Bahraini nationals are mostly enrolled within the private sector (63 per cent of the employed Bahraini population as of mid-2013). Most of the foreign labourers are also employed within the private also as within the domestic sectors: respectively, 78.5 and 20 per cent of the non-Bahraini employed population. The latter accounted for 81 per cent of the private sector’s workforce that year.

The profile of the foreign population is that of a predominantly male (79.3 per cent, or 385 men for 100 women), little educated (82.5 per cent of the entire also as employed foreign populations have below secondary level education) and comparatively young population (mean age is 32.6 years), distorted in its age structure: those within the working age bracket (15-64 years age group) formed 90 per cent of all non-nationals in 2010. As regards their activity, the majority of foreign labourers worked within the construction sector (27.9 per cent), in wholesale and retail trade (16.3 per cent), within the private household sector (16 per cent), and in manufacturing (12.4 per cent). Bahrainis, against this , were employed within the public administration and defence sector (31 per cent of them, and 35 per cent of men alone). However, a sizeable share of nationals also worked in wholesale and trade (13.2 per cent) and in manufacturing (10.8 per cent). Like elsewhere within the Gulf States, the overwhelming majority of foreign nationals were from Asia (84.4 per cent in 2010). Asians also made up the maximum amount as 90 per cent of foreign workers that year; by comparison, Arabs accounted for a mere 4.5 per cent of the workforce. Among Asian nationalities, as of September 2014, Indian nationals alone made up a half all resident expatriates (49.4 per cent), and 47.7 per cent of foreign workers.

Workforce demographics

The foreign resident population in Bahrain displays great demographic and socio-economic diversity. Asian populations (Bangladeshis especially) are mostly made from workers, while Arab populations (with the exception of Yemenis) comprise mainly family dependents. Expectedly, the sex ratio in Arab populations is a smaller amount imbalanced than among Asians. Filipinos are the sole national group made up of a majority of girls , probably thanks to the high share of those nationals employed as female domestic workers within the GCC region.

COVID-19 pandemic and labour market

it's an economic and labour market crisis. it's already clear it'll affect:

1) The quantity of jobs, both unemployment and underemployment (underemployment is especially important due to growing casual and

informal employment); and

2) The quality of labor (e.g. wages, income, social protection).

This crisis will likely have a disproportionate adverse impact on specific, more vulnerable groups (women – who dominate the care sector and have less social protection, migrant workers, refugees, displaced populations, workers with disabilities, gig workers, daily and informal economy workers, the young and55+). Prior to the COVID-19 crisis, the Arab States region had one among the very best unemployment rates globally, with quite 4.68 million unemployed in 2019. As businesses close and economic activities hamper , large numbers of jobs might be lost in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Many of the region’s economies that have long did not create enough jobs for those trying to find one, now face a good more complex situation with the disruption of the bulk of activities.

Underemployment is additionally expected to extend significantly because the economic/social shutdown translates into reductions in working hours and wages. In Lebanon, for instance , where the financial and economic situation was already dire and where large numbers of businesses had either laid off workers or reduced their working hours and wages even prior to the COVID-19 crisis, things becomes extremely dangerous and will be addressed urgently. Moreover, changes within the employment status/situation of workers will directly affect their incomes. for people , this suggests less consumption, which creates a downward spiral for businesses, the latter already struggling to survive in many countries within the region, either due to war and instability (e.g. Syria, Yemen and therefore the OPT) or due to difficult economic environments (e.g. Lebanon). there's an urgent got to mitigate or maybe prevent this feedback loop from forming, otherwise the economic and social devastation will last for much longer than the virus outbreak. Working poverty is predicted to extend significantly, as employment conditions deteriorate and incomes decrease. this is often additionally to the 4.25 million pre-existing working poor within the Arab region, as of 2019, whose employment-related incomes, prior to the COVID-19 crisis, weren't sufficient to lift them and their families out of poverty and ensure decent living conditions. The newer health crisis has potentially devastating consequences for families, with those living in poverty susceptible to becoming even poorer, and an outsized number of additional families falling into poverty. People in working poverty cannot ‘invest’ in health or education and face real challenges affording their basic needs.

Some sectors of the population are often disproportionately affected, thereby increasing inequalities. These include women who are more likely to lack social protection and more likely to possess care responsibilities/work); youth and 55+ workers; additionally to migrant workers and other refugee and displaced populations who, even before this crisis, havembeen subject to discrimination, unequal treatment and poor working and employment conditions, compared with their national counterparts. In terms of gender inequalities, this pandemic has greatly increased the time spent by women in unpaid work. As schools, childcare and other care facilities are closed, Arab women, and particularly those working within the health sector and other vital sectors, face a double burden of longer shifts at work and extra unpaid care work on home. Refugees within the region also are facing compounded challenges. an epidemic of COVID-19 could easily spread through the overcrowded camps and settlements, where people are more vulnerable to getting ill, because they are doing not have proper access to sanitation and handwashing facilities; and at an equivalent time are less capable of fighting off the disease because of barriers to accessing healthcare services. These groups also are greatly impacted by the lockdown imposed by the governments of their respective hosting countries, and have either lost their jobs and incomes, or are risking their lives by getting to work without taking any real protective measures. Daily, on-call and other informal workers who lack economic security and who constitute a large proportion of the workforce within the Arab States, are going to be severely hit. Social protection systems within the region remain weak and fragmented at a time when such support may be a must and universal comprehensive social protection systems can best help governments weather this pandemic. for several countries the scaling from emergency social protection measures to guard income of vulnerable workers and families, particularly those that are currently uncovered, are often a crucial opportunity to line foundations for the development of a more inclusive and comprehensive national social protection system

Government's role

A crucial role of government is to bolster confidence. The “whatever it takes” approach is a good start. Large interventions (of a size only governments can make) can keep things going until a demand-led recovery is possible. Large-scale social assistance, cash transfers, and other support will also be needed, in particular for vulnerable groups and workers. Increased spending on social protection schemes are key. Employment promotion measures, including employment services and vocational training can help workers made redundant to restart once circumstances allow. As governments assemble their fiscal stimuli, there should be a balance between financial support to enterprises to retain workers and measures to support the newly unemployed. Government policies should also ensure not to neglect those affected by humanitarian crises, particularly refugees and displaced populations and/or those living in camps and camp-like settings, facing compounded challenges and vulnerabilities