Question

In: Economics

Suppose we have two identical firms A and B, selling identical products. They are the only...

Suppose we have two identical firms A and B, selling identical products. They are the only firms in the market and compete by choosing quantities at the same time. The Market demand curve is given by P=200-Q. The only cost is a constant marginal cost of $17. Suppose Firm A produces a quantity of 50 and Firm B produces a quantity of 50. If Firm A decides to increase its quantity by 1 unit while Firm B continues to produce the same 50 units, what is the Marginal Revenue for Firm A from this extra unit? Enter a number only, no $ sign.

Solutions

Expert Solution

Demand is given by :

P = 200 - Q where Q = QA + QB, QA = quantity produced by Firm A and QB = quantity produced by Firm B

Initially QA = 50 and QB = 50

=> P = 200 - Q = 200 - (QA + QB) = 200 - (50 + 50) = 100

Total Revenue = Price*Quantity.

So, when Firm A produces 50 units its revenue = P*QA = 100*50 = 5000

Now, Firm A increases production by 1 unit and thus firm A now produces 51 units and Firm B still produces 50 units. So, QA = 51 and QB = 50

=> P = 200 - Q = 200 - (QA + QB) = 200 - (51 + 50) = 99

Total Revenue = Price*Quantity.

So, when Firm A produces 51 units its revenue = P*QA = 99*51 = 5049

Marginal Revenue is the additional Revenue received when it increases production by 1 unit.

Here, when Firm A increases production from 50 to 51, Revenue increases from 5000 to 5049.

So, Marginal revenue for firm A from this extra unit = 5049 - 5000 = 49

Hence, Marginal revenue for firm A from this extra unit = 49


Related Solutions

Suppose that two identical firms are selling a product and that they are the only firms...
Suppose that two identical firms are selling a product and that they are the only firms in the market. Total costs are Ci = 20Qi for each firm. The market demand curve is P = 80 – 0.5Q where Q = Q1 + Q2. The Cournot model describes the competition in this market. Using the above information, complete the below statements, a.)If these two firms collude, their combined output is equal to b.)If these two firms collude, each firm’s output...
Suppose there are two firms, Firm A and Firm B that produce identical products in a...
Suppose there are two firms, Firm A and Firm B that produce identical products in a duopoly. Firm A has a constant marginal cost of production, MCA = 10 and Firm B has a constant marginal cost, MCB = 14. The market demand curve for the the product is given by P = 42 − 0.004Q where Q = (QA + QB). (a) Suppose that Firm A has a first-mover advantage. That is, Firm A is able to choose output...
Suppose that two identical firms produce widgets and that they are the only firms in the...
Suppose that two identical firms produce widgets and that they are the only firms in the market. Their costs are given by C1 = 60 Q1 and C2 = 60 Q2 where Q1 is the output of Firm 1 and Q2 is the output of Firm 2. Price is determined by the following demand curve: P= 2100 − Q where Q=Q1+Q2 Find the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Calculate the profit of each firm at this equilibrium. (For all of the following, enter...
Suppose that two identical firms produce widgets and that they are the only firms in the...
Suppose that two identical firms produce widgets and that they are the only firms in the market. Their costs are given by C1=60Q1 and C2=60Q2 where Q1 is the output of Firm 1 and Q2 is the output of Firm 2. Price is determined by the following demand curve: P=2700−Q where Q=Q1+Q2 Find the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Calculate the profit of each firm at this equilibrium. (For all of the following, enter a numeric response rounded to two decimal places.) When...
Suppose there are two firms operating in a market. The firms produce identical products, and the...
Suppose there are two firms operating in a market. The firms produce identical products, and the total cost for each firm is given by C = 10qi, i = 1,2, where qi is the quantity of output produced by firm i. Therefore the marginal cost for each firm is constant at MC = 10. Also, the market demand is given by P = 106 –2Q, where Q= q1 + q2 is the total industry output. The following formulas will be...
Suppose the natural gas industry consisted of only two firms. Let these firms have identical cost...
Suppose the natural gas industry consisted of only two firms. Let these firms have identical cost functions, C(q) = 40q. Assume the demand curve for the industry is given by P = 100 − Q and that each firm expects the other to behave as a Cournot competitor. a) Calculate the Cournot-Nash equilibrium for each firm, assuming that each chooses the output level that maximizes its profits when taking its rival’s output as given. What are the profits of each...
Two firms a and b have identical price earnings ratio. We know that A’s stock price...
Two firms a and b have identical price earnings ratio. We know that A’s stock price is trading at $200/share; net income amounts to $20 billion a year; and the number of shares of A outstanding amounts to 2 billion. On the basis of this information we conclude that B’s earnings yield amounts to: a. 10.0% b. 5.0% c. 4.0% d. 0.5%
Suppose there are two firms, Boors and Cudweiser, each selling identical-tasting nonalcoholic beer.
Suppose there are two firms, Boors and Cudweiser, each selling identical-tasting nonalcoholic beer. Consumers of this beer have no brand loyalty so market demand can be expressed as P = 5 − .001(Qb + Qc). Boors’ marginal revenue function can be written MR = 5 − .001(2Qb + Qc) and symmetrically for Cudweiser. Boors operates with out-of-date technology and has constant cost of $2 per unit (MC = AC = 2), whereas Cudweiser has constant cost of $1 per unit...
Two identical firms compete in a Bertrand duopoly. The firms produce identical products at the same...
Two identical firms compete in a Bertrand duopoly. The firms produce identical products at the same constant marginal cost of MC = $10. There are 2000 identical consumers, each with the same reservation price of $30 for a single unit of the product (and $0 for any additional units). Under all of the standard assumptions made for the Bertrand model, the equilibrium prices would be Group of answer choices $10 for both firms $30 for both firms $50 for both...
Suppose there are two firms, Boors and Cudweiser, each selling identical-tasting nonalcoholic beer. Consumers of this...
Suppose there are two firms, Boors and Cudweiser, each selling identical-tasting nonalcoholic beer. Consumers of this beer have no brand loyalty so market demand can be expressed as P= 5−.001(QB+ QC). Boors’ marginal revenue function can be written MR= 5−.001(2QB+ QC)and symmetrically for Cudweiser. Boors operates with out-of-date technology and has constant cost of $2 per unit , whereas Cudweiser has constant cost of $1 per unit. How many “units” of beer will Cudweiser produce in the Nash equilibrium?
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT