In: Economics
Suppose that two identical firms produce widgets and that they are the only firms in the market. Their costs are given by
C1 = 60 Q1
and
C2 = 60 Q2
where Q1 is the output of Firm 1 and Q2 is the output of Firm 2. Price is determined by the following demand curve:
P= 2100 − Q where Q=Q1+Q2
Find the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Calculate the profit of each firm at this equilibrium. (For all of the following, enter a numeric response rounded to two decimal places.)
When competing, each firm will produce ___ units of output.
In turn, each firm will earn profit of ___.
Suppose the two firms form a cartel to maximize joint profits. How many widgets will be produced? Calculate each firm's profit.
Each firm will produce ___ units of output.
In turn, each firm will earn profit of ___.
Suppose Firm 1 were the only firm in the industry. How would market output and Firm 1's profit differ from that found in above?
Firm 1 would produce ___ units of output.
Firm 1's would earn profit of ___.
Returning to the duopoly above, suppose Firm 1 abides by the agreement but Firm 2 cheats by increasing production. How many widgets will firm produce? What will be each firm's profits?
Firm 2 would cheat by producing ___ units of output.
As a consequence, Firm 1 would earn profit of ___.
Firm 2 would earn profit of ___.
P=2100-Q1-Q2
MR1=2100-2Q1-Q2
MC1=60
MR1=Mc1
2100-2Q1-q2=60
Q1=1020-0.5Q2 { best response function of firm 1}
By symmetry,.
Q2=1020-0.5Q1{ best response function of firm 2}
Q2=1020-0.5(1020-0.5Q2}
Q2=510/0.75=680( each firm Production in cournot equilibrium}
Q=680+680=1360
P=2100-1360=740
Profit of each firm=(740-60)*680=462,400
Cartel,
They will act as monopoly,
P=2100-Q
MR=2100-2Q
MC=60
2100-2q=60
Q=2040/2=1020
q1=Q2=1020/2=510
P=2100-1020=1080
Profit of Each firm=(1080-60)*510=520,200
Monopoly,
Q=1020
P=1080
Profit of firm 1=(1080-60)*1020=1,040,400
Cheating,
q2=1020-0.5Q1
Q2=1020-0.5*510=765
Q=510+765=1275
P=825
Profit of firm 1=(825-60)*510=390,150
Profit of firm 2=(825-60)*765=585,225