In: Accounting
The use of the budget as a fixed performance contract leads to
unreliable performance evaluation and promotes budget gaming. This
criticism relates to the assertion of budgets as a means that
encourage gaming and
perverse behaviours. According to Hope and Fraser, organizations
that use budgets usually set targets on the basis of financial
numbers that, more often than not, are negotiated between superiors
and subordinates before the start of the year. The numbers are
fixed for the year ahead and represent the key component of the
“annual
fixed performance contract”. Rewards are then linked to a fixed
outcome agreed to in advance. Managers know (and supposedly
therefore accept) that this element of the budget contract leads to
gaming. Gaming is a commonly recurring phenomenon in relation to
the budget process. However, it is not the budget process itself
that is the root cause of the counterproductive actions; rather, it
is the use of budget targets to determine compensation.
When managers are told they will get bonuses if they reach
specific performance goals, two things inevitably happen. First,
they attempt to set low targets that are easily achievable. Then,
once the targets are in place, they do
whatever it takes to ensure that they hit them, even if the company
suffers as a result. The latter has been evident in several studies
which have found that the budget pressure facing managers leads to
dysfunctional and manipulative
behaviour such as
Such studies indicate that management incentives coupled to budgets and/or the felt pressure to achieve budget targets are factors that correlate with the degree of manipulative behaviour, especially in relatively uncertain environments.