Question

In: Economics

A firm is considering entering a market where demand for its product is Q = 100...

A firm is considering entering a market where demand for its product is Q = 100 - P. This demand function implies that the firm’s marginal revenue function is MR = 100 - 2Q. The firm’s total cost of producing the product for that market is TC = 860 + 20Q + Q2 which indicates that its marginal cost function is MC = 20 + 2Q. Calculate the firm’s profit and hence indicate whether or not the firm should enter the market. Also represent your findings on an appropriate graph.

Solutions

Expert Solution

ANSWER:-

Here firm's equilibrium condition is MR = MC.

=> 100 - 2Q = 20 + 2Q

=> 100 - 20 = 2Q + 2Q

=> 80 = 4Q

=> Q = 80 / 4

Q = 20

  From demand function, we get

Q = 100 - P

=> 20 = 100 - P

=> P = 100 - 20

  P = 80

TR (Total Revenue) = P * Q = 80 * 20

TR = 1600  

TC = 860 + (20 * 20) + (20)^2

=860+400+400

  TC = 1660

Profit = TR - TC

= 1600 - 1660

    Profit  = - 60

Here the firm faces loss of $60. As here the firm face loss, hence the firm should not enter into the market.  

The above findings are shown by the following picture's diagram.

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