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In: Statistics and Probability

There are two players in the game. Each player can pick any integer number between 1...

There are two players in the game. Each player can pick any integer number between 1 and n. If two numbers are the same then player 1 pays 1 dollar to player 2. If two numbers are different than nothing happens.

(a) Prove that there are no equilibria in pure strategies;

(b) Prove that in the equilibrium each strategy should be played with a positive probability.

(c) Find all NE of the game.

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Expert Solution

orchestra answered 2 years ago
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