True or False (proof or counterexample): In any Nash equilibrium, a player is always indifferent between...

True or False (proof or counterexample): In any Nash equilibrium, a player is always indifferent between playing any of her pure strategies.

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Expert Solution

False

Nash equilibrium strategy is that gives highest payoff ,given rival strategy unchanged.

So In nash equilibrium ,player choose those pure strategies that gives highest payoff ,given other player strategy unchanged.

Rahul Sunny answered 1 year ago

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