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In: Economics

2. Two players participate in a contest where the winner gets R and the loser gets...

2. Two players participate in a contest where the winner gets R and the loser gets P-R, 0 ≤ R ≤ P. The two players have identical convex cost of effort functions C(e). The chance player i wins is ei/(e1+e2). Show that, at equilibrium, effort increases in R.

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