In: Economics
America's Chief Executive makes a problem for legal researchers. Presidents today sit at the focal point of the political universe. They have gotten liable for national security and monetary development, they are the head of their ideological groups, and their proposition set the authoritative plan for Congress. With the military intensity of the United States behind them, presidents were referred to during the Cold War as the pioneers of the free world.
President George W. Bush invoked his constitutional powers, though often supported by congressional approval, to launch wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, detain al Qaeda and Taliban members as enemy combatants subject to military trials, and use aggressive interrogation and electronic surveillance measures against terrorists. President Barack Obama has invoked his constitutional authority to order the detention facility at the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba closed, suspend military commission trials, and limit the interrogation of terrorists. Differences in policies also occur in areas as diverse as global warming, antiballistic missile defenses, national health care, and judicial appointments.
For legal scholars, the problem created by this state of affairs is that the central importance of the modern Presidency seems to contradict the Constitution’s text. The Constitution undeniably enumerates more powers for Congress than the president. Congress has the authority to tax, spend, and regulate interstate commerce, which provides it with the power to enact domestic legislation. In contrast, Article II of the Constitution seems to vest the president with a paltry sum of powers. Scholars, such as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr (1973) , coined the classic phrase the “imperial presidency” to describe the idea that over time the executive branch has assumed powers that the Constitution directs to others.According to this view, the Presidency has few inherent constitutional powers, but rather exists to carry out the laws passed by Congress. Even in foreign affairs and national security, the legislature should play the leading role in defining national policy. The Presidency’s growth into the dominant political institution it is today may be the product of changes in the national political system or external pressures, but that makes it no more legitimate.
According to the weak theory, to which Professors Calabresi and Yoo subscribe, the national executive is unitary in the sense that the President has the power to provide policy direction to officers of the United States, to remove from their positions any such officers who refuse to comply with the President’s policy directions, and to implement presidentially determined policy directly by transmitting policy directives to employees who are obliged to carry them out or themselves face dismissal.
Calabresi and Yoo, be that as it may, characterize the unitary official in a much smaller path than the current debate over presidential force would request. They characterize the unitary official as established on the president's protected power to order or expel all subordinate authorities. Regarding whether the president has any other natural or inferred powers, the creators announce themselves to be "rationalist". Concentrating on the methodology, as opposed to the substance, of official force may bode well as an issue of lawyerly contention. All Calabresi and Yoo wish to demonstrate is the president's power in the administration of the official branch, paying little heed to the position's genuine forces.