Question

In: Statistics and Probability

At carnivals and entertainment parks, there is a popular game of horse-racing. Each player has a...

At carnivals and entertainment parks, there is a popular game of horse-racing. Each player has a movable horse on the display whose number corresponds to his or her alley number. The game consists of rolling a ball up an alley, where it can land in one of 15 holes. The holes are colored according to the graphic in the margin. If your ball lands in a red hole, your horse advances one space. If it lands in yellow, your horse advances two spaces, and if it lands in green, your horse gallops ahead three spaces. After your ball goes in the hole, it returns to you for your next roll. The first horse that moves 12 spaces is the winner, and the jockey, the person rolling the ball, receives a stuffed animal as a prize. One customer is at the game, bragging that he always wins after eight rolls. You look over the game and estimate that you have a 40% chance of getting the ball in a red hole, a 30% chance of getting it in a yellow hole, and a 20% chance of getting it in a green hole. There is also a 10% chance that you miss the holes, and your ball returns to you without advancing the horse. Based on your estimates of the probabilities, is it worthwhile to play the game against the bragging customer? What is the chance you will win by the eighth roll? EXCEL SHEET formulas!

Solutions

Expert Solution

Solution

Strategy:

Compute the expected number of steps the horse would advance in 8 rolls [the number claimed by one customer]. If this expected number is 12 or more, play the game; otherwise, do not play.

Concept Base:

Expected number of times the ball would land in a hole of a particular color = 8 x probability the ball would land in a hole of that color

Expected number of steps the horse would advance in 8 rolls

= Σ(Expected number of times the ball would land in a hole of a particular color x number of steps the horse advances for that color) – summed over all possible colors, including no color (i.e., miss the hole)

Now to work out the solution,

Summary of Excel calculations is tabulated below:

Number of Rolls

8

Hole Color

Prob

E(N)

# of steps

E(Steps)

Red

0.4

3.2

1

3.2

Yellow

0.3

2.4

2

4.8

Green

0.2

1.6

3

4.8

Miss Hole

0.1

0.8

0

0

Total

1

8

6

12.8

Vide ‘strategy’ above, since 12.8 > 12, decision is to play. Answer

Excel details

Cell labels

Number of Rolls

g40

Hole Color

Prob

E(N)

# of steps

E(Steps)

Red

f42

g42

h42

i42

Yellow

f43

g43

h43

i43

Green

f44

g44

h44

i44

Miss Hole

f45

g45

h45

i45

Total

f46

g46

h46

i46

Excel commands:

G42 = (f42*$g$40); G42 = (g42*h42);

Drag g42 down to g45 and i42 to i45

F46 = SUM(f42:f45) and drag f46 to i46

DONE


Related Solutions

Blackjack, or 21, is a popular casino game that begins with each player and the dealer...
Blackjack, or 21, is a popular casino game that begins with each player and the dealer being dealt two cards. The value of each hand is determined by the point total of the cards in the hand. Face cards and 10s count 10 points, aces can be counted as either 1 or 11 points, and all other cards count at their face value. For instance, the value of a hand consisting of a jack and an 8 is 18; the...
Below is a game between player A and player B. Each player has two possible strategies:...
Below is a game between player A and player B. Each player has two possible strategies: 1 or 2. The payoffs for each combination of strategies between A and B are in the bracket. For example, if A plays 1 and B plays 1, the payoff for A is -3, and the payoff for B is -2. Player B Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Player A Strategy 1 (-3,-2) (10,0) Strategy 2 (0,8) (0,0) How many pure strategy Nash equilibria does...
Below is a game between player A and player B. Each player has two possible strategies:...
Below is a game between player A and player B. Each player has two possible strategies: 1 or 2. The payoffs for each combination of strategies between A and B are in the bracket. For example, if A plays 1 and B plays 1, the payoff for A is 1, and the payoff for B is 0. Player B Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Player A Strategy 1 (1,0) (0,1) Strategy 2 (0,1) (1,0) How many pure strategy Nash equilibria does...
Game Description: The popular rock-paper-scissors game is usually played between two people in which each player...
Game Description: The popular rock-paper-scissors game is usually played between two people in which each player simultaneously chooses either a rock or a paper or scissors (usually with an outstretched hand). The rule of the game is simple: rock crushes scissors, scissors cut paper, and paper wraps rock. If both the players choose the same object, then it ends in a tie. Problem Description: You have to play the rock-paper-scissors game against the computer for 100 times. You receive the...
Provide an example of a 2-player normal form game where each player has 3 (pure) strategies...
Provide an example of a 2-player normal form game where each player has 3 (pure) strategies such that: (i) There is exactly one pure strategy Nash equilibrium. (ii) There are exactly two pure strategy Nash equilibria. (iii) There are exactly three pure strategy Nash equilibria. (iv) There are exactly nine pure strategy Nash equilibria
This game is meant for two or more players. In the game, each player starts out...
This game is meant for two or more players. In the game, each player starts out with 50 points, as each player takes a turn rolling the dice; the amount generated by the dice is subtracted from the player’s points. The first player with exactly one point remaining wins. If a player’s remaining points minus the amount generated by the dice results in a value less than one, then the amount should be added to the player’s points. (As an...
Consider a game with two players, each of whom has two types. The types of player...
Consider a game with two players, each of whom has two types. The types of player 1 are T1 = (a,b). The types of player 2 are T2 = (c,d). Suppose the beliefs of the types are p1(c/a) = p2(a/c) = 0.25 and p1(c/b) = p2(a/d) = 0.75. Is there a common prior? If yes, construct one; if no, prove why not.
Consider the following game that has two players. Player A has three actions, and player B...
Consider the following game that has two players. Player A has three actions, and player B has three actions. Player A can either play Top, Middle or Bottom, whereas player B can play Left, Middle or Right. The payoffs are shown in the following matrix. Notice that a payoff to player A has been omitted (denoted by x). Player B    Left Middle Right Top (-1,1) (0,3) (1,10) Middle (2,0) (-2,-2) (-1,-1) Bottom (x,-1) (1,2) (3,2) (player A) Both players...
Two players (player A and player B) are playing a game against each other repeatedly until...
Two players (player A and player B) are playing a game against each other repeatedly until one is bankrupt. When a player wins a game they take $1 from the other player. All plays of the game are independent and identical. Suppose player A starts with $6 and player B starts with $6. If player A wins a game with probability 0.5, what is the probability the game ends (someone loses all their money) on exactly the 10th play of...
(10 marks) Two players (player A and player B) are playing a game against each other...
Two players (player A and player B) are playing a game against each other repeatedly until one is bankrupt. When a player wins a game they take $1 from the other player. All plays of the game are independent and identical. a) Suppose player A starts with $2 and player B starts with $1. If player A wins a game with probability p, what is the probability that player A wins all the money? b) Suppose player A starts with...
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT