Question

Case 4: Basma (formerly, Patricia) a recent convert to Islam, alleges that she was terminated from her job as a metal punch operator in a large metal fabrication plant because of her religion (Islam). Shortly after her conversion, she notified her supervisor, Ken, that her new faith requires her to dress according to hijab, "the correct standard of modesty." She also stated that this meant she could no longer wear pants, as required by the factory’s dress code. She further requested religious accommodation by being permitted to wear the jibaab (long and loose-fit coat or garment worn by some Moslem women) while at work.

Ken responded that this could not be done as OHSA and other safety regulations precluded anyone from working around the machinery in loose clothing. Basma, then said asked Ken if he could transfer her to another job. Ken told the only other jobs in the plant where industrial hoist and gantry crane operator and programmer/analyst. Ken informed her that since she possessed no programming skills, that she was not qualified for the programmer/analyst job. He then asked her if she could operate an industrial hoist/gantry crane, she responded that she could not.

When Basma showed up for work the next day in a jibaab, Ken told her to go home and return in the appropriate work attire. When she refused, she was terminated.

Basma immediately filed a complaint with the EEOC for religious accommodation. Her employer is a Title VII employer, but management contends that the dress code is essential to the safe and efficient operation of the mill, and the company has evidence that the dress code was imposed following several accidents in which loose shirts worn by employees were caught in the same type of mill machinery that Basma operates.

a. Can Basma establish a prima facie case for religious accommodation? Why? (5 points)

b. Has Ken violated Title VII? Why or why not? (4 points)

c. Given the above scenario, is there a reasonable religious accommodation for Basma? If so, what? (2 points)

Answer 1

For establishing prima facie relgious discrimination under title VII, a person will have to prove that

(i) He /she practiced a religion which had a belief that contradicted the employer's requirements at job.

(ii) Employee had informed his /her employer about the religious beliefs and how they contradicted with the job.

(iii) Employer did not accommodated his /her religious beliefs where he /she could have easily done so.

From the case, it can be seen that the employer tried its best to accommodate Besma in other open roles, but she was not eligible for any open opportunity or capable of doing a job which was available. Her request for loose garments at work could not be accommodated as they posed a serious risk of workplace accidents and compromised her own safety as well as those of others. In this way, a proma facie discrimination can not be established.

Ken did not violate title VII, because accommodating Besma could have caused an undue hardship for employer ( It was potentially dangerous to let her work with the attire of her choice).

Given the scenario, there can be no reasonable accommodation for Besma until a new job for which she is eligible opens up, which does not have job related restrictions related to attire.