Question

Whats the obligations of pregnancy from a context of moral reasoning, culture, and religious identity.

Answer 1

The idea of legal contract is insufficient as a normative approach for resolving the questions presented in this dissertation for several reasons. First, as stated above, the pregnant woman’s legal right to refuse medical care or treatment carries no obligation to undergo a treatment or procedure for the benefit of her fetus. Second, the fetus is unable to actually enter into any contract or agreement with the pregnant woman. Third, the pregnant woman cannot be held to specific performance for breaching the contract. Conflicts can still occur between pregnant woman, their physicians, and others involved in the pregnant woman’s care due to differences in the legal and moral requirements of contract in this situation. Therefore, contract will not provide a common distinct alternative normative model for resolving maternal-fetal conflict. Since legal contract is inadequate as a normative approach there is no point in pursuing contract in the context of the physician-patient relationship. For example, there are different models of contract that a pregnant woman can make with her physician. These models vary in how the fetus is viewed by the pregnant woman and her physician, impacting the care and treatment that the fetus receives. The pregnant woman and her physician may not agree on which model is appropriate. The pregnant woman also has the option to decline or change her mind about her care and treatment at any point in the pregnancy, regardless of whatever previous decisions she made or contracts she entered into with her physicians. The physician – patient contract model also has the limitation of specifying minimal duties, self-interest, and neglecting care. The case of abortion can be enlightening. Not having an abortion when legally permissible does not create a contract with the fetus or a promise by the pregnant woman to bring her fetus to a live birth. The refusal of abortion may create a role obligation in some authors’ opinions. But whether this role obligation actually exists depends upon whether the pregnant woman believes she has a duty or moral obligation to her fetus as her child to be. In sum, legal contract does not provide a common normative approach or theory for resolving situations of maternal-fetal conflict.

There is no consistent answer as to the pregnant woman’s moral obligation to her fetus in this dissertation’s situation of maternal-fetal conflict based on normative legal, philosophical, professional medical organizations, and religious theories and approaches. Unfortunately, this contributes to maternal-fetal conflict rather than resolving it. The lack of common ground is a result of different beliefs and values among those involved. These may come from more than one of the above theories and approaches. Unless one party can convince the other to change his or her values and beliefs, the conflict persists.