In: Economics
Can you explain and answer part e and part f please? I already understand parts c and d
Firm 1 and Firm 2 are functioning in a market as competitors. The inverse market demand for chicken is given by P (Y ) = 100 − 2Y , and the total cost function for any firm in the industry if given by TC(y) = 4y.
(c) Suppose that two Cournot firms operated in the market and the reaction firm for Firm 1 is y1 = 24−y2/2 and Firm 2 is y1 = 24−y1/2. If they are operating at the Cournot equilibrium point, what would be the industry output?
(d) Based on the information in part (c), how much would each firm produce and what would be the market price?
(e) For the Cournot case, draw the two reaction curves
and indicate the equilibrium point on the graph. Explain the
reaction of each firm.
(f) Suppose one firm acts as a Stackleberg leader and the other
firm behaves as a follower, how much would the leader and follower
produce?