Question

8.2 Explain the game theoretic formulation of the Hobbesian and Lockean states of nature based on Axelrod’s Evolution of Cooperation. How do the states differ in the possibilities for cooperative behavior in the absence of government? How do these differences affect the social contracts that members of the societies would voluntarily enter? What does game theory tell us about the role of social contracts in promoting cooperation? You do not need to use precise notation, but you should be as verbally precise as possible.

Answer 1

Answers

Almost twenty years ago John Immerwahr described in this journal a class

room simulation designed as an analog of Hobbe model of the mutual transfer

of rights in the formation of a social contract.1The game is skillfully designed,

easy to administer, and straightforwardly adaptable to classes in economics, so-

ciology, psychology, political science, ethics, and social and political philosophy.

An important reason for the wide range of interest is that both Hobbes’ state of na-

ture and Immerwahr’s game can be represented and elucidated by the principles of

game theory. Indeed, the lucidity imposed by a game-theoretic framework greatly

simplifies the various possible interactions without significant misrepresentation

and promotes student comprehension. My purpose for this note is specified in

three parts: (1) The Game: to re-acquaint a new generation of teachers with one of

the finest philosophy simulations ever designed and to discuss its game-theoretic

implications, (2) Observations: to show why certain undesirable pedagogical fea-

tures of the game reported by Immerwahre, for example the trickery and betrayal

of trust among students, need not occur in the performance of the game (and spill

over in succeeding classes), and (3) Conclusion: to note that the outcomes of Im-

merwahr’s game need not be viewed as typical and indeed are actually far different

than he supposed.

Co-operation among nations has become the focus of a wide range of studies in the past decade. The recent international relations literature about cooperation has adopted a distinct approach. It has tended to focus on the systematic level of analysis. It has also used game theory as its central tool of analysis. This review evaluates this literature, arguing that these methodological choices have contributed to both the greatest strengths and the greatest weaknesses of the literature in explaining cooperation among nations. The recent literature on international cooperation has made two general contribution. First it has developed a concept of cooperation, which can help distinguish what behavior counts as cooperation and which has been adopted widely in the field. Second, the literature has tried to illuminate the conditions under which cooperation is likely to emerge. Using game theory to model relations as the systematic level parsimoniously, scholars have developed at least six hypotheses about the circumstances that promote cooperative behavior. The recent literature also suffers from at least two serious problems. The first problem flows from the assumptions used to generate the relatively parsimonious hypotheses. In particular, the way in which the assumption of anarchy is used cause problems. Second, and relatedly, the literature shows a remarkable neglect of domestic politics. As will be argued, this poses a serious limitations for understanding cooperation. Systemic theory simply cannot take us far enough. The international-level hypotheses depend on implicit theories about internal politics. Hypotheses about domestic influences on cooperation among states are not well developed. Although systemic theory has been touted for a variety of reasons, the biggest gains in understanding international cooperation in the future are likely to come from domestic level theories.

A commons story line in science fiction sagas is that modern society crumbles because of a nuclear world war or a colossal ecological disaster. A few isolated survivings humans forage through the ruins of destroyed cities, hoping to find a stray can of food, a container of gasoline, or a box of bullets. Every contact with another human is a life-or-death struggle to acquire the other person’s goods. Rather thans looking into the future to describe a post-apocalyptic world, Hobbes looks to the distant past and asks us to imagine what life might have been like before there were any governing bodies. The conditionthat Hobbes describes is as brutal as any science fiction story. He calls this primitive condition the state of nature. He is not describing an actual time in human history, but, rather, hopes only to highlight the limits of our human nature and the effect's of our unsocial inclinations on our interactions with others.

A second reasons for our unsociability is that people are roughly equal to one another in both intellectual cunning and physical strength, and this make us feel as though we can acquire what we want in life without too much resistance from other people. Intellectually, we all gain knowledge through experiences, and, with enough time and effort, we can all rise to a comparable intellectual level. Physically, althoughs a bigger person might be able to beat me in an arm wrestling contest, with a little cunning I can overpower him. Hobbe's writes that as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret mechinations, or by confederacy with others that are in the same danger with himself. Although intellectual and physical equality might seem like good things, in the state of nature they only perpetuate struggle. If someone stoods out with superhuman physical abilities, such as Superman, then he could simply take controls and force people to cooperate. Perhaps the same thing could happen if someone stood outs with superhuman intellectual abilities. But sinces we’re all more or less equal in the state of nature, no one will naturally emerge to take charge.

Social contract theory, nearly as old as philosophys itself is the view that person moral and or political obligations are dependent upon a contract or agreement among them to form the society in which they live. Socrate uses something quite like a social contract argument to explain to Crito why he must remain in prison and accept the death penalty. However, social contracts theory is rightly associated with modern moral and political theory and is given its first full exposition and defense by Thomas Hobbe. After Hobbe, John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau are the best known proponents of this enormously influential theory which has been one of the most dominant theorie within moral and political theory throughout the history of the modern Wests. In the twentieth century, moral and politicals theory regained philosophical momentum as a result of John Rawls Kantian version of social contract theory and was followed by new analyses of the subject by David Gauthiers and others. More recently, philosopher's from differents perspectives have offered new criticisms of social contracts theory. In particular, feminists and race conscious philosophers have argued that social contract theory is at least an incomplete picture of our moral and political lives and may in facts camouflage some of the ways in which the contract is itself parasitical upon the subjugations of classes of persons.

Thankyou for your question. any way all the best.