Question
In: Economics
Lets say I have a 2 firm game with homogenous products with the demand function: P...
Lets say I have a 2 firm game with homogenous products with the demand function:
P = A - BQ
What would be my theoretical Consumer, Producer and Total Surplus for Cournot, Stackelberg and Bertarand competitions?
Solutions
Expert Solution
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Rahul Sunny answered 8 months agoRelated Solutions
Lets say that I were to give you a sorted list of P elements that was...
Lets say that I were to give you a sorted list of P elements
that was followed by randomly ordered elements. Please explain how
you would sort the entire, whole list? Please give a detailed
reasoning and provide a good explanation (In language C++)
Please type answer if you can
The market (inverse) demand function for a homogenous good is P(Q) = 10 – Q. There...
The market (inverse) demand function for a homogenous good is
P(Q) =
10 – Q. There are three firms: firm 1 and 2 each have a total cost
of Ci(qi) = 4qi for i ∈ {1.2}. and firm 3 has a total cost of
C3(q3) = 2q3. The three firms compete by setting their quantities
of production, and the price of the good is determined by a market
demand function given the total quantity. Calculate the Nash
equilibrium in this...
Consider a market for a homogenous good (Hobbit beer) with the following inverse demand function: p(y)...
Consider a market for a homogenous good (Hobbit beer) with the
following inverse demand function:
p(y) = 22 − 2y where y is total sold quantity of the beer in
litres on the market and p(y) is the price it sells for. There is
only one firm serving the market, Samwise beer inc. The firm’s cost
function is c(y) = 4y.
a) What quantity of beer will be sold on the market? What will
be the market price?
Suddenly, a...
Q: A homogenous-good duopoly faces an inverse market demand function of P = 57 – Q....
Q:
A homogenous-good duopoly faces an inverse market demand
function of P = 57 – Q. Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of MC1
= 10. Firm 2’s constant marginal cost is MC2 = 6. Calculate the
output of each firm, market output, and price for a Nash-Cournot
equilibrium. Draw the best response functions for each firm.
Show the solution steps please
Lets say I owned a business worth $100 million dollars and I have 25% stake in...
Lets say I owned a business worth $100 million dollars and I
have 25% stake in the company. Lets say 100% of the what I own in
the company will be taxable and I am married and it will be filed
jointly. Company's net income is $17.5 million.
If I was selling the company how much estate tax attributable
would I be facing filing jointly?
Lets say I owned a business worth $100 million dollars and I have 25% stake in...
Lets say I owned a business worth $100 million dollars and I
have 25% stake in the company. Lets say 100% of the what I own in
the company will be taxable and I am married and it will be filed
jointly. Company's net income is $17.5 million.
What would be the estate tax attributable, 100% interest will be
taxable and filling jointly?
Also can you please mention some tax laws that would be
beneficial in this situation?
1. Assume the market demand function is D(P)=100 – P and the firm cost function is...
1. Assume the market demand function is D(P)=100 – P and the
firm cost function is C(q)= 20q. The industry is populated by many
small firms that offer identical products. In the absence of
regulation, a competitive equilibrium would be achieved. However,
regulation is in place and requires that a firm’s price be at least
as great as 30. Derive the effect of regulation on quantity, firm
profits, and social welfare.
2. Now think that the industry is deregulated. What...
A firm faces the following demand function: p = 1100 − 30q. As usual, p and...
A firm faces the following demand function: p = 1100 − 30q. As
usual, p and q are the price and the quantity of the good. The cost
function for this firm is defined by C = 20q2 + 100q + 1500.
(a) Is it economically reasonable to have q = 40?
Explain.
(b) Write down the profit function for this firm.
(c) Find the optimal level of production q∗ and check whether
it pertains to a maximum or to...
lets say i make a PYTHON code that lets a user guess a number between 1-1000,...
lets say i make a PYTHON code that lets a user guess a number
between 1-1000, every failed attempt you get a hint (go lower or go
higher) how can i penalize the user if they dont follow the hints,
example ( go higher!... your next pick: a smaller number... 2 you
loose $100 for not following hint) 2 and the user has unlimited
attempts, until he guesses the number, this is made using
random.randint(1,1000) function THE ONLY THING IM...
2. A firm has a demand and cost function given by: D: P=100-Q, C: P=10+2q1+4q2 a)...
2. A firm has a demand and cost function given by: D: P=100-Q,
C: P=10+2q1+4q2
a) Demonstrate whether this firm has economies to scale.
b) Demonstrate whether this firm has economies of scope.
c) Assume that the firm is the only firm in the market, derive
graphically and numerically the optimal quantity, price and the
profits/losses.
d) What is the Lerner Index? Provide a numerical value and
explain the relevance of the index/how it is used
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