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In: Economics

Lets say I have a 2 firm game with homogenous products with the demand function: P...

Lets say I have a 2 firm game with homogenous products with the demand function:

P = A - BQ

What would be my theoretical Consumer, Producer and Total Surplus for Cournot, Stackelberg and Bertarand competitions?

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i hope this would help you ..it you like the work please appreciate thank you !

Rahul Sunny answered 7 months ago
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