Question

Q. 2. Write a detailed report on any two chemical Hazards happened in Oman or in the Gulf region.

Answer 1

Solution :
The Bhopal disaster, also referred to as the Bhopal gas tragedy, was a gas leak incident on the night of
2–3 December 1984 at the Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) pesticide plant in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh,
India. It is considered among the world's worst industrial disasters. Over 500,000 people were exposed to
methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas. The highly toxic substance made its way into and around the small towns
located near the plant.

Date 2 December 1984 – 3 December 1984

Location Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, India

Coordinates 23°16′51″N 77°24′38″E
Also known as Bhopal gas tragedy
Cause Methyl isocyanate leak from Union Carbide India Limited plant
Deaths At least 3,787; over 16,000 claimed
Non-fatal injuries At least 558,125

Estimates vary on the death toll. The official immediate death toll was 2,259. In 2008, the Government of
Madhya Pradesh had paid compensation to the family members of 3,787 victims killed in the gas release,
and to 574,366 injured victims. A government affidavit in 2006 stated that the leak caused 558,125 injuries,including 38,478 temporary partial injuries and approximately 3,900 severely and permanently disabling injuries. Others estimate that 8,000 died within two weeks, and another 8,000 or more have since diedfrom gas-related diseases. The cause of the disaster remains under debate. The Indian government and local activists argue that slack management and deferred maintenance created a situation where routine pipe maintenance caused a back?ow of water into a MIC tank, triggering the disaster. Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) argues water entered the tank through an act of sabotage.

The owner of the factory, UCIL, was majority owned by UCC, with Indian Government-controlled banks
and the Indian public holding a 49.1 percent stake. In 1989, UCC paid $470 million (equivalent to $845
million in 2018) to settle litigation stemming from the disaster. In 1994, UCC sold its stake in UCIL to
Eveready Industries India Limited (EIIL), which subsequently merged with McLeod Russel (India) Ltd.
Eveready ended clean-up on the site in 1998, when it terminated its 99-year lease and turned over
control of the site to the state government of Madhya Pradesh. Dow Chemical Company purchased UCC
in 2001, seventeen years after the disaster.

Civil and criminal cases ?led in the United States against UCC and Warren Anderson, UCC CEO at the time
of the disaster, were dismissed and redirected to Indian courts on multiple occasions between 1986 and
2012, as the US courts focused on UCIL being a standalone entity of India. Civil and criminal cases were
also ?led in the District Court of Bhopal, India, involving UCC, UCIL and UCC CEO Anderson.[7][8] In June
2010, seven Indian nationals who were UCIL employees in 1984, including the former UCIL chairman,
were convicted in Bhopal of causing death by negligence and sentenced to two years imprisonment and
a ?ne of about $2,000 each, the maximum punishment allowed by Indian law. All were released on bail
shortly after the verdict. An eighth former employee was also convicted, but died before the judgement
was passed.

Liquid MIC storage
The Bhopal UCIL facility housed three underground 68,000-litre liquid MIC storage tanks: E610, E611, and
E619. In the months leading up to the December leak, liquid MIC production was in progress and being
used to ?ll these tanks. UCC safety regulations speci?ed that no one tank should be filled more than 50%
(here, 30 tons) with liquid MIC. Each tank was pressurized with inert nitrogen gas. This pressurization
allowed liquid MIC to be pumped out of each tank as needed, and also kept impurities out of the tanks.

In late October 1984, tank E610 lost the ability to effectively contain most of its nitrogen gas pressure,
which meant that the liquid MIC contained within could not be pumped out. At the time of this failure,
tank E610 contained 42 tons of liquid MIC.[17][18] Shortly after this failure, MIC production was halted at
the Bhopal facility, and parts of the plant were shut down for maintenance. Maintenance included the
shutdown of the plant's ?are tower so that a corroded pipe could be repaired.[17] With the ?are tower still
out of service, production of carbaryl was resumed in late November, using MIC stored in the two tanks
still in service. An attempt to re-establish pressure in tank E610 on 1 December failed, so the 42 tons of
liquid MIC contained within still could not be pumped out of it.

By early December 1984, most of the plant's MIC related safety systems were malfunctioning and many
valves and lines were in poor condition. In addition, several vent gas scrubbers had been out of service as
well as the steam boiler, intended to clean the pipes.[6] During the late evening hours of 2 December
1984, water was believed to have entered a side pipe and into Tank E610 whilst trying to unclog it, which
contained 42 tons of MIC that had been there since late October.[6] The introduction of water into the
tank subsequently resulted in a runaway exothermic reaction, which was accelerated by contaminants,
high ambient temperatures and various other factors, such as the presence of iron from corroding nonstainless steel pipelines.[6] The pressure in tank E610, although initially nominal at 2 psi at 10:30 p.m., it had reached 10 psi by 11 p.m. Two different senior re?nery employees assumed the reading was
instrumentation malfunction.[19] By 11:30 p.m., workers in the MIC area were feeling the effects of minor
exposure to MIC gas, and began to look for a leak. One was found by 11:45 p.m., and reported to the MIC
supervisor on duty at the time. The decision was made to address the problem after a 12:15 a.m. tea break, and in the meantime, employees were instructed to continue looking for leaks. The incident was
discussed by MIC area employees during the break.

In the ?ve minutes after the tea break ended at 12:40 a.m., the reaction in tank E610 reached a critical
state at an alarming speed. Temperatures in the tank were off the scale, maxed out beyond 25 °C (77 °F),
and the pressure in the tank was indicated at 40 psi (275.8 kPa). One employee witnessed a concrete slab
above tank E610 crack as the emergency relief valve burst open, and pressure in the tank continued to
increase to 55 psi (379.2 kPa); this despite the fact that atmospheric venting of toxic MIC gas had already
begun.[19] Direct atmospheric venting should have been prevented or at least partially mitigated by at
least three safety devices which were malfunctioning, not in use, insufficiently sized or otherwise
rendered inoperable.

• A refrigeration system meant to cool tanks containing liquid MIC, shut down in January 1982, and whose freon had been removed in June 1984. Since the MIC storage system assumed refrigeration, its high temperature alarm, set to sound at 11 °C (52 °F) had long since been disconnected, and tank storage temperatures ranged between 15 °C (59 °F) and 40 °C (104 °F)[22]
• A flare tower, to burn the MIC gas as it escaped, which had had a connecting pipe removed for maintenance, and was improperly sized to neutralise a leak of the size produced by tank E610
• A vent gas scrubber, which had been deactivated at the time and was in 'standby' mode, and similarly had insufficient caustic soda and power to safely stop a leak of the magnitude produced.

About 30 tonnes of MIC escaped from the tank into the atmosphere in 45 to 60 minutes.[3] This would
increase to 40 tonnes within two hours.[23] The gases were blown in a southeasterly direction over
Bhopal.

A UCIL employee triggered the plant's alarm system at 12:50 a.m. as the concentration of gas in and
around the plant became difficult to tolerate.[19][23] Activation of the system triggered two siren alarms:
one that sounded inside the UCIL plant itself, and a second directed to the exterior, which would alert the
public and the city of Bhopal. The two siren systems had been decoupled from one another in 1982, so
that it was possible to leave the factory warning siren on while turning off the public one, and this is
exactly what was done: the public siren brie?y sounded at 12:50 a.m. and was quickly turned off, as per
company procedure meant to avoid alarming the public around the factory over tiny leaks.[23][25][26]
Workers, meanwhile, evacuated the UCIL plant, travelling upwind.

Bhopal's superintendent of police was informed by telephone, by a town inspector, that residents of the
neighbourhood of Chola (about 2 km from the plant) were ?eeing a gas leak at approximately 1 a.m.[25]
Calls to the UCIL plant by police between 1:25 and 2:10 a.m. gave assurances twice that "everything is OK",
and on the last attempt made, "we don't know what has happened, sir".[25] With the lack of timely
information exchange between UCIL and Bhopal authorities, the city's Hamidia Hospital was ?rst told that
the gas leak was suspected to be ammonia, then phosgene. Finally, they received an updated report that
it was "MIC" (rather than "methyl isocyanate"), of which hospital staff had never heard of and had no
antidote for, nor did they receive any immediate information about it.

The MIC gas leak emanating from tank E610 petered out at approximately 2:00 a.m. Fifteen minutes later,
the plant's public siren was sounded for an extended period of time, after ?rst having been quickly
silenced an hour and a half earlier.[28] Some minutes after the public siren sounded, a UCIL employee
walked to a police control room to both inform them of the leak (their ?rst acknowledgement that one
had occurred at all), and that "the leak had been plugged."[28] Most city residents who were exposed to
the MIC gas were ?rst made aware of the leak by exposure to the gas itself, or by opening their doors to
investigate commotion, rather than having been instructed to shelter in place, or to evacuate before the
arrival of the gas in the first place.

The initial effects of exposure were coughing, severe eye irritation and a feeling of suffocation, burning in
the respiratory tract, blepharospasm, breathlessness, stomach pains and vomiting. People awakened by
these symptoms ?ed away from the plant. Those who ran inhaled more than those who had a vehicle to
ride. Owing to their height, children and other residents of shorter stature inhaled higher concentrations,
as methyl isocyanate gas is approximately twice as dense as air and, therefore, in an open environment
has a tendency to fall toward the ground.

Thousands of people had died by the following morning. Primary causes of deaths were choking,
re?exogenic circulatory collapse and pulmonary oedema. Findings during autopsies revealed changes not
only in the lungs but also cerebral oedema, tubular necrosis of the kidneys, fatty degeneration of the liver
and necrotising enteritis.[30] The stillbirth rate increased by up to 300% and neonatal mortality rate by
around 200%.

Gas cloud composition
Apart from MIC, based on laboratory simulation conditions, the gas cloud most likely also contained
chloroform, dichloromethane, hydrogen chloride, methylamine, dimethylamine, trimethylamine and carbon
dioxide, that was either present in the tank or was produced in the storage tank when MIC, chloroform
and water reacted. The gas cloud, composed mainly of materials denser than air, stayed close to the
ground and spread in the southeasterly direction affecting the nearby communities.[29] The chemical
reactions may have produced a liquid or solid aerosol.[31] Laboratory investigations by CSIR and UCC
scientists failed to demonstrate the presence of hydrogen cyanide.

Immediate aftermath
In the immediate aftermath, the plant was closed to outsiders (including UCC) by the Indian government,
which subsequently failed to make data public, contributing to the confusion. The initial investigation was
conducted entirely by the Council of Scienti?c and Industrial Research (CSIR) and the Central Bureau of
Investigation. The UCC chairman and CEO Warren Anderson, together with a technical team, immediately
travelled to India. Upon arrival Anderson was placed under house arrest and urged by the Indian
government to leave the country within 24 hours. Union Carbide organized a team of international
medical experts, as well as supplies and equipment, to work with the local Bhopal medical community, and
the UCC technical team began assessing the cause of the gas leak.

The health care system immediately became overloaded. In the severely affected areas, nearly 70% were
under-quali?ed doctors. Medical staff were unprepared for the thousands of casualties. Doctors and
hospitals were not aware of proper treatment methods for MIC gas inhalation.

There were mass funerals and cremations. Photographer Pablo Bartholemew, on commission with press
agency Rapho, took an iconic color photograph of a burial on 4 December, Bhopal gas disaster girl.
Another photographer present, Raghu Rai, took a black and white photo. The photographers did not ask
for the identity of the father or child as she was buried, and no relative has since con?rmed it. As such,
the identity of the girl remains unknown. Both photos became symbolic of the suffering of victims of the
Bhopal disaster, and Bartholomew's went on to win the 1984 World Press Photo of the Year.

Within a few days, trees in the vicinity became barren and bloated animal carcasses had to be disposed of.170,000 people were treated at hospitals and temporary dispensaries, and 2,000 buffalo, goats, and other animals were collected and buried. Supplies, including food, became scarce owing to suppliers' safety fears. Fishing was prohibited causing further supply shortages.

Lacking any safe alternative, on 16 December, tanks 611 and 619 were emptied of the remaining MIC by
reactivating the plant and continuing the manufacture of pesticide. Despite safety precautions such as
having water-carrying helicopters continually overflying the plant, this led to a second mass evacuation
from Bhopal. The Government of India passed the "Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Act" that gave the
government rights to represent all victims, whether or not in India. Complaints of lack of information or
misinformation were widespread. An Indian government spokesman said, "Carbide is more interested in
getting information from us than in helping our relief work".

Formal statements were issued that air, water, vegetation and foodstuffs were safe, but warned not to
consume ?sh. The number of children exposed to the gases was at least 200,000.Within weeks, the State
Government established a number of hospitals, clinics and mobile units in the gas-affected area to treat
the victims.

2 chemical hazard:
Keywords: Chlorine, disaster management, neutralization, port

On the morning of 14 July 2010, chlorine leak incidence was reported at Haji Bunder hazardous cargo
warehouse in the Mumbai Port Trust (MPT), Sewri, affecting over 120 people in the neighborhood,
including students, laborers, port workers and ?re ?ghters, of whom 70 were reported critical. Sewri yard
on one side is adjacent to LBS College of Advance Life Time Studies and Research, while a vast area of
sea and vacant land lies on the other side. The leak was observed at nearly 3:00 a.m. Many students from
LBS College hostel that is barely 100 m from the site of leak were affected. Those who were sleeping
were the most affected and they started vomiting. Examination saved many students who were awake
and studying.[3] Suddenly, they felt suffocated and they saw outside their rooms a blanket of smoke in the
yard where chlorine cylinders were kept. By 4:00 a.m., the hostels were completely evacuated. Police
vans and ambulances took the victims to the hospital where it took few hours for the clinical symptoms of
the victims to subside. The Mumbai Police has registered gas leakage case against unidentified persons.
Chlorine, under ordinary conditions of temperature and pressure, is a greenish yellow gas with a
characteristic pungent smell and suffocating odor. Gaseous chlorine is approximately 2.5 times heavier
than air. Liquid chlorine is clear amber in color and 1.5 times heavier than water. Chlorine reacts readily
with lime and caustic soda to form hypochlorites. Hence, lime and caustic soda solutions are generally
used for handling chlorine leaks.

Chlorine gas is a primarily a respiratory irritant. It is extremely irritating to the mucous membrane, the eyes
and respiratory tract. The threshold limit values (TLV) of chlorine is 1 ppm or 3 mg/m3 of air. If the duration
of exposure or the concentration of chlorine is excessive, it causes restlessness, throat irritation, sneezing
and copious salivation. In extreme cases, lung tissues may be attacked, resulting in pulmonary edema.

The revised Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH) is 10 ppm and the fatal dose is 1000 ppm.
The prolonged symptoms intolerable to patient might lead to possibilities of pulmonary embolism,
denudation of alveolar and bronchial epithelium, pulmonary edema, chemical pneumonitis, alveolar
disruption and, as a rare complication, pneumomediastinum. This rare complication needs to be
understood for providing immediate care to the victims in the proper way. In case of acute exposure, it
may lead to acute lung injury (ALI) and/or acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) due to which 1% of
the patients might die. Humidi?ed oxygen and inhaled β-adrenergic agents are appropriate therapies for
victims with respiratory symptoms while assessments are underway. Inhaled bicarbonate and systemic or
inhaled glucocorticoids also have been reported anecdotally to be beneficial. However, it is still at an
experimental level and requires further clinical evidence prior to its universal utility.

It was learnt that the chlorine cylinders have been abandoned by an importer nearly a decade ago in 1997
and MPT has been unsuccessful in selling off these cylinders.[4] According to MPT officials, the leak
occurred from one of 141 cylinders stored at the storage place. For over 6 hours, rescue and relief teams
struggled to control the situation and it took ?re officials, Bombay's Municipal Corporation teams, and
experts from Herdillia Chemicals, Rashtriyia Chemicals and Fertilizers, Century Rayon and Mutual Aid
Response Group, to identify, seal, and clamp the leaking of other cylinders. Fire ?ghters created water
curtains in the area diluting the gas cloud that was spreading because of the leakage. The air pressure
thus created helped the clouds of chlorine to ?oat toward the sea. The neutralization process of the
remaining chlorine ?lled cylinders using caustic soda and water was carried out by the National Disaster
Response Force (NDRF) and other emergency responders. Out of 105 cylinders that had been found, 100
were clean but ?ve of them had residual chlorine that leaked out. On an average, 6 hours had been
consumed in cleaning one cylinder. In all, 16 out of 100 cylinders were neutralized. It was noticed that
MPT did not have a chlorine neutralization tank, which every establishment that stores and uses chlorine
maintains, to control such conditions. It was also observed that no safety guidelines were observed or
safety systems maintained at the facility.

Observations and Lessons Learnt

Prima facie, it is a blatant case of ignorance and negligence as well as contraventions to the safety and
environmental safeguard requirements under existing statues as well as non-maintenance of failsafe
conditions at the site. Following reasons can be attributed for the grave incidence of leakage. 1) According
to Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals (MSIHC) rules, 1989,[5] under the
Environment (Protection) Act 1986, the imported cylinders which were lying in the open should have been
accepted for delivery as empties, only if the residual chlorine was fully evacuated either at the facility at
the exporting country or here at Mumbai as created in the vicinity of port or with assistance taken from a
chlorine manufacturing or user industry having facilities of evacuation and neutralization. Until this was
done, cylinders with residual chlorine should not have been stacked in the open where there was a
likelihood of temperature and pressure increase, triggering busting of a cylinder with respect to standards
laid down for the said parameters. 2) The area of storage should have been provided with suction
pipelines and suction hoods connected with neutralization tank, which should have been in continuous
operations. 3) Cylinders should have been imported with certi?cation from competent authority on the
residual life as well as present state of soundness certi?ed through Non Destructive Testing (NDT) like
hydraulic testing, thickness survey and radiography of the welded joints and approved by Chief Controller
of Explosives (CCE). An inventory check at Haji Bunder warehouse revealed that at least 77 consignments
containing 1168 packages were lying unclaimed. These packages comprise hydrogen sul?de and nitrous
oxide, apart from chlorine. It calls for immediate actions to prevent any such emergency.

Managing Chlorine Leaks

Chlorine gas is stored in cylinders in a compressed form (around 400 V of gas is compressed to 1 V) and,
in case of any leakage, lique?ed gas is released, which takes heat from the ambient conditions for
evaporation. Therefore, as a safety precaution, yard of chlorine cylinders is covered to minimize the effect
of ambient temperature, as well as the surrounding of the cylinder yard is continuously cooled by
installing high-pressure water nozzles to create a water blanket. This would help in reducing the
evaporation rate and generation of cryogenic stresses; in case arrangement for spreading foam on the
leaked compressed gas is made, the evaporation is further reduced. As a safeguard, the leak in the
gaseous form is collected with the help of suction systems which suck the leakage in the gas form and
take it to the neutralization tank which is kept running 24 × 7, where provision for alternate power supply
is also made.

Dos and don’ts for chlorine emergency management

For 141 cylinders that are stacked at the incident site, the safety requirement is to provide monitors at the
periphery of the yard, as well as an arrangement for anemometer for ascertaining wind speed and
direction, and a public address system to communicate with the neighborhood population. We observed
that none of the above safeguards were considered to be provided when it was not ruled out that
cylinders contained residual or more chlorine gas which leaked even after storage for more than a
decade. The next point of concern was maintaining the cylinders in an unattended form in the open
where chances of ingress of mixture cannot be ruled out, and as the leak has developed, it could have
been the result of corrosion in the cylinder or giving way of the fusible plug or leakage developed in a
wall as moist chlorine is very corrosive and can corrode the containing vessel.

The primary requirement while participating in such rescue and response operations is to wear protective
clothing including gas masks, ?re and chemical proof suits, gloves and shoes; self-contained breathing
apparatus (SCBA) is essential while working in hot zones. The six gas cylinders were degassed by NDRF
and two of them were dumped into the deep sea 40 km from the shore. One of these was found on sea
shore of Worli, Mumbai, on 21 July, and this might have been due to high tide. NDRF and Bomb Disposal
Squad along with other ?rst responders rushed to the site. The cylinder was taken to check its weight to
see whether it was still hazardous or not, as the cylinders that were dumped into sea after the gas leak
contained 850–900 kg of chlorine. This observation revealed that mechanism of neutralization and
disposal should be environment friendly and permanent in nature; otherwise, the problem will persist for
longer periods.

Statutory Requirements

According to MSIHC rules, 1989 (as amended 1994, 2000),[5] various provisions on safety report, night site noti?cation report, display of Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) at site in different languages, as well ason-site and off-site emergency plan should have been observed and the responsibilities assigned with legal backing to Chief Controller of Export and Import, Chief Inspector of Dock Safety, Chief Controller of Explosives as well as safety establishment of Port Trust should have been very well adhered to avoid such nature of grave incidence which shakes the con?dence of public in the hazard control measures adopted by chemical storages as well as other establishments like warehouses, container depots, dock yards, etc.

National Disaster Management Authorities’ Activities Toward Zero Tolerance

National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) has prepared and released National Guidelines on
Chemical (Industrial) Disaster Management in May 2007,[6] which calls for re?ning and strengthening
national mechanisms on prevention, preparedness and mitigation from stages of planning to ?eld
operations and response. The guidelines have also set in timelines of action under short-, medium- and
long-term modules to achieve zero tolerance in the chemical safety.
In its objective to achieve the results, NDMA, jointly with Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF),
Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board (PNGRB), Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce andIndustries (FICCI) have conducted 10 regional conferences and two national mega conferences. Out of these, two conferences exclusively dealt with safety and security provisions in handling of chemical cargo in ports, warehouses and isolated storages. NDMA has also conducted 25 mock exercises inclusive of testing of on-/off-site emergency plans, wherein about around 50 Major Accident Hazard (MAH) units
participated. Some of these exercises were conducted in the storages and chemical facilities in the ports.
The outcome of such awareness campaigns was compiled in the form of referral books, i.e., Chemical
Industrial Disaster Management (CIDM)-2009 and Chemical Mock Exercises: Good Practices and Lessons Learnt (2010).[7,8] CIDM-2010 compendium has also been compiled and will be released in the next sequel national conference proposed to be held in Delhi in August 2010.[9] The consortium also proposes to accelerate the program pertaining to awareness generation, education, and training across the country.

Ministry of Environment and Forests is preparing a National Action Plan on the basis of national guidelines
prepared by NDMA to ensure fast implementation of provisions contained in the guidelines to help in
achieving zero tolerance in chemical disasters in the country.

Community risk management

Community can be taken as a group that may share one or more things in common, such as living in the
same environment, exposed to similar risk exposure, having been affected by hazard, having common
problems, concern and hopes regarding risk and resources. Risk may arise when a hazard strikes a
community. If skills, resources, and readiness are insufficient, if weaknesses are too great, and if the scale
of hazard is too big, then the risk is too high. A holistic approach to community risk management is
required by building capacity and dealing with root causes in order to reduce the total risk. The traumatic
impacts of chemical disasters (like Minimata and Bhopal gas tragedy) are well known as they caused huge
losses to human lives, liquidation of the entrepreneurs (millions of rupees worth of property and
investment in high-cost infrastructure were lost) and damage to environment. A high all round concern is
developing worldwide on innocent lives lost or dicey functional posterity born out as a disaster
consequence. The sufferings of the community during post-disaster phase are endless, which have moved
the world against the defaulters.

Basic approaches to risk management include managing the source of the threat and empowering the
community. Substantial amount of catastrophic risk needs to be exported out from the local context. One
of the prime aims of disaster management is to develop a national community that is informed, resilient
and prepared to face disasters with minimal loss of life, while ensuring adequate care for the survivors.
People's own strategies and capacities to cope with, recover from, survive, and adapt to the risks they
face and bounce back is the most important resource for managing risk and disaster. During sudden
disasters, where every second counts, well-prepared local teams can save more lives. Community
resilience includes the ability to anticipate disasters and react quickly and effectively when the disaster
strikes.

Disaster resilient communities can be built by enhancing community participation, appreciation of the
problem, and being part of solution making process.[10] It is the ability of community to anticipate
disasters and react quickly and effectively when they strike. The process of building resilience may include
awareness generation, organizing health and sanitation fairs, involving them in mock drills to give
directions to their actions, public–private partnership, and development of local capacities by education
and training programs. To start with, it may be aimed at initiation of developing a culture of household
sanitation, precautions to use electricity or noxious products at family level, safe handling of domestic
chemicals, basic disaster related education including dramas, demonstrations, and poster competitions at
school level, discussions, symposia, and introduction to curriculum at college level and preference in jobs
to those who are aware of disaster mitigation. Next step could be preparation of job-speci?c disaster
manuals at occupation level and inclusion of these as a major program in all developmental processes.
Chemical speci?c resilience can also be developed in a similar way through need specialized training,
speci?c Dos and Don’ts, and community awareness [Table 1]. It varies from generation to generation and
has developed after the commissioning of industrial hubs in a particular vulnerable area. It needs active
participation of industries, transparency in their actions and of district administration to build up
con?dence among the community. Pharmacists also have a big role to play in this national endeavor.

The information management pertaining to safety issues using authenticated internet resources as well as
freely accessible databases of critical information on data models and case studies can provide sufficient
in-depth information to save many lives.

Chemical Disaster Management: Challenges Ahead

Current status and perspectives of chemical disaster management[8,13] deduce that such incidences are
preventable. The use of poisonous gases, ranging from disabling chemicals such as tear gas and the
severe mustard gas to lethal agents like phosgene and chlorine in World War I, was a major military
innovation. Iraqi insurgents are now using suicide bombs laden with chlorine gas, a signi?cant expansion in terrorism. Chemical industry needs to be secured against acts of terrorism.

We need to create a single window national level capability and competence to advise, train, and share
development in hazardous chemicals by conducting education, training, mitigation, and R & D activities.
The Chlorine Institute, Inc. at USA founded in 1924, is a non-pro?t technical trade association of chlorine
manufacturers, distributors, users, and many related companies, whose business interest is safety in the
manufacture, transport, and use of chlorine and related products.[16] The institute's concerns focus on
enhancements to chlorine container design, safe transportation of chlorine, employee health and safety,
the elimination of chlorine releases to the environment, control of chlorine emergencies, and
product/process speci?cations. The prime objective is to handle the chlorine safely to prevent the
occurrence of any emergency. Establishment of similar type of institute is an essentiality attributing
toward the chlorine safety in India.

Focus of training and retraining should be on ?eld-based activities using stimulants or live hazardous
chemical/materials to create various scenarios that might occur in everyday lives and to test the
emergency plans by practicing coordinated response.[7,17] Such inspirational learning environment
wherein the trainees can study the theory and then go out and practice, will nurture efficient response
mechanisms. Such training facilities shall make protocols and practical instruction as realistic as possible.
Training ?eld should be developed to enable exercises in hazardous CBRN substance emissions, ?re-
?ghting, Hazmat response, search and rescue, medical management of CBRN casualties, etc. Training
ground should be well equipped and environmentally quality certi?ed. The idea is to provide an optimum
learning experience in a safe environment. This method of training will also promote awareness of
environmental and safety issues. Training ground shall be used to enact scene for joint exercises with
police, ambulance teams, and other stakeholders and emergency functionaries, creating synergy effects
for all players.

Emergency preparedness and capacity development in terms of adequately trained human resources and
infrastructure are the basic issues in the pre-event planning. Capabilities for assessment of damage
potential along with development of strategies, tools, devices and resources inventory is essential to
mitigate the damage induced and improve the medical response in a holistic and coordinated manner.
Management of mass casualty incidences involving chlorine needs overall preparedness and risk reduction amongst all stakeholders/service providers/emergency functionaries, including contingency planning and capacity development for an efficient response.

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