Discuss the potential costs of attacks (such as 9/11 or the Boston Marathon and even smaller attacks; notwithstanding the human losses) when the attacks are successful in the Homeland
Attacks like the 9/11 attacks were as effective as a non-weapons-of-mass-destruction strike from the terrorists' perspective: the fall of the World Trade Center resulted in massive casualties and property damage for lightly equipped attackers. Nonetheless, the direct expenses did not significantly affect the US economy. The attack's potential costs are many. For instance, the cost of the 9/11 assault in terms of states, personal securities, and other personal possessions surpasses $2 trillion (Faria & Arce, 2021). Terrorist groups also bear the expense, with al-Qaida spending almost half a million dollars on the assaults on the World Trade Centers. Despite this, the losses and repairs cost the US government $3.3 trillion. In general, the potential cost of assaults in the United States is relatively large, always near to or above $1 trillion in most situations, and is a drag on the country's financial performance and stability.
Following the 9/11 attacks, there was a significant rise in defense spending and increases in some forms of foreign aid, and additional expenditure on newly categorized "homeland security" tasks. The Center for American Progress has established a handy category to group this expenditure. Estimates were presented as a percentage of GDP for fiscal years 2001 through 2004. These figures pointed to an increase in security spending of 1.3 or 1.4 percent of GDP, presumably over time. This is a considerable sum compared to the direct expenses of the 9/11 attacks. In any case, the significant, easily observable economic consequence of terrorism is the cost of defense and homeland security spending. This is also true in nations where the danger of terrorism is far more widespread (Hassapis et al., 2019). Terrorist attacks in Israel do so little direct harm that Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) do not include them in their estimates. However, the second intifada was linked to an increase in defense spending percentage of GDP, from 9 percent to 12 percent.
Attacks like 9/11 were as effective as a non-weapons-of-mass-destruction strike from the terrorists' perspective.