Question

In: Economics

Consider two complementors: Firm 1 and Firm 2. Demand functions for firms 1 and 2 aregiven...

Consider two complementors: Firm 1 and Firm 2. Demand functions for firms 1 and 2 aregiven by

Q1¿)=1600−200P1-100P2

Q2¿)=1600−200P2-100P1

Suppose that the marginal cost functions of firms 1 and 2 are given byMC1(Q1)=MC2(Q2)=0. What price should each firm charge to maximize its profit? Showyour calculation precisely

Solutions

Expert Solution

Profit = TR - TC

Here MC = 0 and Fixed cost has no role to play in the decision making because it has already been incurred and is not taken into recoverable.

Profit of firm 1 is given by:

=> Profit(Pr1) = TR1 - TC1 = P1Q1 - Q1*MC1 - F1

= P1(1600−200P1-100P2) - 0 - F1 where F1 is some fixed cost

First order condition :

d(Pr1)/dP1 = 0 => 1600 - 100P2 - 400P1 = 0

=> 4P1 + P2 = 16 -------------------------------(1)   

Profit of firm 2 is given by:

=> Profit(Pr2) = TR2 - TC2 = P2Q2 - Q2*MC2 - F2

= P2(1600−200P2-100P1) - 0 - F2 where F2 is some fixed cost

First order condition :

d(Pr2)/dP2 = 0 => 1600 - 100P1 - 400P2 = 0

=> 4P2 + P1 = 16 -------------------------------(2)

From (1) and (2) we get : 4P2 + P1 = 16 = 4P1 + P2 => P1 = P2

=> 5P1 = 5P2 = 16 => P1 = P2 = 16/5 = 3.2

Hence Firm 1 should charge 3.2 and Firm should charge 3.2 in order to maximize their respective profits.


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