In: Economics
Suppose that the (inverse) demand curve for Cranberries is given by P = 40 − 6Q and TC = $4Q + $3Q2
Marginal cost (MC) = dTC/dQ = 4 + 6Q
(a) In competitive market, P = MC.
40 - 6Q = 4 + 6Q
12Q = 36
Q = 3
P = 40 - (6 x 3) = 40 - 18 = 22
(b) When there are two firms, assuming Cournot duopoly, P = 40 - 6q1 - 6q2
MC1 = 4 + 6(q1 + q2) = 4 + 6q1 + 6q2
MC2 = 4 + 6(q1 + q2) = 4 + 6q1 + 6q2
For firm 1,
Total revenue (TR1) = P x q1 = 40q1 - 6q12 - 6q1q2
Marginal revenue (MR1) = TR1/q1 = 40 - 12q1 - 6q2
Equating MR1 and MC1,
40 - 12q1 - 6q2 = 4 + 6q1 + 6q2
18q1 + 12q2 = 36
3q1 + 2q2 = 6..........(1) (Best response, firm 1)
For firm 2,
Total revenue (TR2) = P x q2 = 40q2 - 6q1q2 - 6q22
Marginal revenue (MR2) = TR2/q2 = 40 - 6q1 - 12q2
Equating MR2 and MC2,
40 - 6q1 - 12q2 = 4 + 6q1 + 6q2
12q1 + 18q2 = 36
2q1 + 3q2 = 6..........(2) (Best response, firm 2)
Cournot equilibrium is obtained by solving (1) and (2).
(1) x 2 yields: 6q1 + 4q2 = 12...........(3)
(2) x 3 yields: 6q1 + 9q2 = 18...........(4)
(4) - (3) yields: 5q2 = 6
q2 = 1.2
q1 = (6 - 3q2)/2 [From (2)] = [6 - (3 x 1.2)]/2 = (6 - 3.6)/2 = 2.4/2 = 1.2
Q = 1.2 + 1.2 = 2.4
P = 40 - (6 x 2.4) = 40 - 14.4 = 25.6
(c) A monopolist will equate MR with MC.
P = 40 - 6Q
Total revenue (TR) = P x Q = 40Q - 6Q2
MR = dTR/dQ = 40 - 12Q
40 - 12Q = 4 + 6Q
18Q = 36
Q = 2
P = 40 - (6 x 2) = 40 - 12 = 28
(d) The higher the number of firms, the lower the market price and the higher the market quantity. Therefore, if there are 3 firms, price (P*) will lie between the price in duopoly and perfect competition, and quantity (Q*) will lie between the price in duopoly and perfect competition. So,
25.6 > P* > 22, and
3 > Q* > 2.4.