Question

1. Michael Tooley proposes a thought experiment that involves injecting kittens with a chemical that gives them a mind like ours. Explain in what context, why, Tooley uses such a thought experiment. In other words, what is the purpose of such experiment and what does Tooley want to accomplish with such an example?

Answer 1

Tooley’s example runs one thing just like the following; imagine there was a chemical that, once injected into a kitten, would build it become a cat with the psychological characteristics of a person's person . we'd then ought to contemplate kittens that are injected with this chemical as having a similar ethical rights as persons. but if you killed a kitten rather than injecting it with this chemical, he thinks that there would are no seriously virtuously wrong action taken (sweeping aside the actual fact that pointlessly killing a kitten may well be quite wrong in itself). His purpose is that it's no distinction in killing a kitten once there's the potential to bestow person-like ethical value upon it than once there's not. He then goes on to mention that although we have a tendency to had injected it with the chemical, as long because the kitten had not absolutely developed the person-like attributes that might allow it person-like ethical value, then there's still nothing seriously virtuously wrong with either killing the kitten, or injecting it with another chemical to neutralize the primary one (thereby stopping the method of the cat from developing person-like properties) .

the instance is meant to indicate that if there's nothing seriously wrong with destroying (Rachels’ locution for ‘killing’) AN injected kitten with the potential to develop the human psychological qualities necessary for individuality, then there's conjointly nothing wrong with destroying a fetus that, just like the kitten, lacks the required human psychological characteristics of individuality, however holds potential to amass them. the sole distinction between the 2 cases is that the fetus perpetually had the potentiality whereas intervention would be needed for the kitten. he's careful to state that he's not claiming a fetus has no qualities to grant it ethical value, solely that the conservative perspective of disputation against abortion on the idea of potentiality is imperfect .

Tooley’s argument is meant to be a right away refutation of the conservative read that abortion is virtuously wrong because of the actual fact it deprives a fetus of its potential to possess a future life like ours (the living) . The conservative read is that this potentiality bestows a robust ethical significance upon a fetus, whereas Rachels feels this can be virtuously moot. His cat-person example is meant to supply AN analogy which is able to show however once thinking of a non-human creature we'd not impute a similar ethical value strictly on the idea of potentiality. In my read he overlooks the actual fact that it's still virtuously wrong to kill a kitten or a cat unnecessarily, and if this position holds then it should even be virtuously impermissible to kill a fetus