Question

In: Economics

Determine what the dominant strategy is for each player in each game below: a. ​​​​​​ Bonnie’s...

Determine what the dominant strategy is for each player in each game below:

a. ​​​​​​

Bonnie’s Decision

Confess

Remain Silent

Clyde’s

Decision

Confess

Bonnie gets 8 years

Clyde gets 8 years

Bonnie gets 20 years

Clyde goes free

Remain Silent

Bonnie goes free

Clyde gets 20 years

Bonnie gets 1 year Clyde gets 1 year

b.

Jack’s Decision

High Production

Low Production

Jill’s

Decision

High Production

$1,600 profit for Jack

$1,600 profit for Jill

$1,500 profit for Jack

$2,000 profit for Jill

Low Production

$2,000 profit for Jack

$1,500 profit for Jill

$1,800 profit for Jack

$1,800 profit for Jill

c.

Decision of United States (U.S.)

Arm

Disarm

Decision of Soviet Union (USSR)

Arm

U.S. at risk

USSR at risk

U.S. at risk and weak

USSR safe and powerful

Disarm

U.S. safe and powerful

USSR at risk and weak

U.S. safe

USSR safe

Solutions

Expert Solution

a. Given that Clyde confess, Bonnie's best response is to confess(Get 8 years).
Given that Clyde remain silent, Bonnie's best response is to confess(Goes free).
Given that Bonnie confess, Clyde's best response is to confess(Get 8 years).
Given that Bonnie confess, Clyde's best response is to confess(Get 8 years).
The dominant strategy for both players is to confess as it is always their best response.

b. Given that Jill chose high production, Jack's best response is high production($1600).
Given that Jill chose low production, Jack's best response is high production($2000).
Given that Jack chose high production, Jill's best response is high production($1600).
Given that Jack chose low production, Jill's best response is high production($2000).
The dominant strategy for both players is to choose high production as it is always their best response.

c. Given that USSR choose arm, US's best response is arm.
Given that USSR choose disarm, US's best response is arm.
Given that US choose arm, USSR's best response is arm.
Given that US choose disarm, USSR's best response is arm.
The dominant strategy for both countries is to choose arm as it is always their best response.


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