Question
In: Economics
Question An item is up for auction. Player 1 values the item at 3 while player...
Question An item is up for auction. Player 1 values the item at 3 while player 2 values the item at 5. Each player can bid either 0, 1, or 2. If player i bids more than player j then i wins the good and pays his bid, while the loser does not pay. If both players bid the same amount then a coin is tossed to determine who the winner is, and the winner gets the good and pays his bid while the loser pays nothing.
(a) Write down the game in matrix form.
(b) What will be the Nash equilibrium?
(c) What will be the equilibrium (SPNE) if player 1 bids first?
(d) What if player 2 goes first?
I got (1/2 , 3/2 ) for question b is that correct?
Can Someone help me with b, c and d ?
Solutions
Rahul Sunny answered 2 years agoRelated Solutions
Question 3 Jo and Jim are bidding in a second-price, independent, private value auction. Their values...
Question 3 Jo and Jim are bidding in a second-price,
independent, private value auction. Their values for the object are
independently and uniformly distributed on the interval (1,2). (1)
What is the expected value of the winning bidder? (2) What is the
expected value of the price?
An all-pay auction is a type of auction which allocates the good to the player with...
An all-pay auction is a type of auction which allocates the good
to the player with the highest bid, and where all bidders pay their
bid (even if they lose). Suppose that there are two bidders, with
private valuations uniformly distributed on the interval 0 to 1. A
bidder who wins the auction has a payoff of vi ?
bi. A bidder who loses the auction has a payoff of
?bi. a. Suppose that player 2 pays the bidding strategy...
An all-pay auction is a type of auction which allocates the good to the player with...
An all-pay auction is a type of auction which allocates the good
to the player with the highest bid, and where all bidders pay their
bid (even if they lose). Suppose that there are two bidders, with
private valuations uniformly distributed on the interval 0 to 1. A
bidder who wins the auction has a payoff of vi ?
bi. A bidder who loses the auction has a payoff of
?bi. a. Suppose that player 2 pays the bidding strategy...
Question? Identify the relationships of Player and Player fields including PKs, CKs, and FDs. While using...
Question?
Identify the relationships of Player and Player fields including
PKs, CKs, and FDs. While using the entities and fields found in
Player, create a DBDL example of tables, fields, and key fields
that are in third normal form.
Instructions: Convert this table to an equivalent collection of
tables, fields, and keys that are in the third normal form.
Represent your exercise answers in DBDL design from the database
normalization phases.
The player contains information about players and their
teams....
Auction Auction Price Age of Item Number Bidders 1 $946 113 9 2 $1,336 126 10...
Auction
Auction Price
Age of Item
Number Bidders
1
$946
113
9
2
$1,336
126
10
3
$744
115
7
4
$1,979
182
11
5
$1,522
150
9
6
$1,235
127
13
7
$1,483
159
9
8
$1,152
117
13
9
$1,545
175
8
10
$1,262
168
7
11
$845
127
7
12
$1,055
108
14
13
$1,253
132
10
14
$1,297
137
9
15
$1,147
137
8
16
$1,080
115
12
17
$1,550
182
8
18
$1,047
156
6...
Second price auction is quite similar to a first price auction(each player bids secrectly choosing a...
Second price auction is quite similar to a first price
auction(each player bids secrectly choosing a nonnegative real
number) and each player i value the object viwhere
v1 > v2 > ....>vn > 0,
except that the winner pays the amount of the second highest
bid.
Prove that for player i, bidding vi is a weakly
dominant strategy. That is, prove that regardless of the actions of
the other players, player i payoff when bidding vi is at
least as...
Consider a second price auction with 2 bidders, 1 and 2, who have values for the...
Consider a second price auction with 2 bidders, 1 and 2, who
have values for the good of 20 and 80, respectively. Each knows
what the other bidder’s valuation is so there is no
uncertainty.
(a) Show that choosing a bid equal to one’s valuation is a
weakly dominant strategy for bidder 1.
(b) Show that if each bidder plays a weakly dominant strategy,
the bidder with the highest value always wins the good
(c) Is it a Nash equilibrium...
Question 3 Part a JKL Ltd bought an item of equipment at $4 million on 1...
Question 3
Part a JKL Ltd bought an item of equipment at $4 million on 1
January 2017, it had estimated life of 8 years and residual value
at $800,000. The equipment was depreciated on straight line basis.
However, the Inland Revenue Department does not allow depreciation
as deductible expenses. Instead, tax expenses of this type of asset
can be claimed against income tax in the year of purchase and 20%
per annum (on reducing balance basis) of tax base...
Question 3 Part a JKL Ltd bought an item of equipment at $4 million on 1...
Question 3
Part a
JKL Ltd bought an item of equipment at $4 million on 1 January
2017, it had estimated life of 8 years and residual value at
$800,000. The equipment was depreciated on straight line basis.
However, the Inland Revenue Department does not allow depreciation
as deductible expenses. Instead, tax expenses of this type of asset
can be claimed against income tax in the year of purchase and 20%
per annum (on reducing balance basis) of tax base...
Jane wants to auction off an item, but does not know where to go to find...
Jane wants to auction off an item, but does not know where to go
to find bidders. David offers to find bidders for her, but will
charge her $10 per bidder he gets to show up. Each bidder will
uniformly value the item between [500. 1000). The highest bidder
will win the item and pay the second-highest bidder's price
(Vickrey auction). How many bidders should Jane pay David to
find?
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