Consider a team that chooses attendance Q(measured in millions) to maximize profit. Let the inverse demand...

Consider a team that chooses attendance Q(measured in millions) to maximize profit. Let the inverse demand curve be

P = 100 – 20Q

which has the associated marginal revenue function equal to

MR = 100 – 40Q

Also, let the total cost function be given by

TC = 50 + 4Q

for which the marginal cost is MC= 4. Find the team’s optimal output, price, and profit.

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Expert Solution

Rahul Sunny answered 1 year ago

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