Two teams are simultaneously competing in a programming competition. The time it takes team 1 to...

Two teams are simultaneously competing in a programming competition. The time it takes team 1 to solve the set of programming tasks is uniformly distributed between 5 and 10 hours. For team 2, the time is uniformly distributed between 7 and 10 hours.

(a) Find the probability density function (pdf ) of the completion time for the entire competition. Assume independence between the completion times in both teams.

(b) Find the expected competition completion time.

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orchestra answered 2 years ago

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Two teams are simultaneously competing in a programming competition. The time it takes team 1 to...

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