In: Economics
Some State Governments around Australia have pursued policies to merge Local Government Councils. Explain the economic rationale for these policies, use cost curves and related evidence to support your arguments.
In general, the consequences of structural reform programs in
Australia
local government have typically consisted of forced and voluntary
council
amalgamations, the development of a multitude of co-operative
organizational
arrangements between adjacent municipal councils, especially in
regional, rural
and remote areas of the country (Dollery and Johnson 2005), as well
as boundary
changes to the spatial configuration of council responsibilities,
largely through
recommendations by the various state-based Local Government
Boundary
Commissions to reform-minded state governments. The Local
Government
Association of Queensland (2005, p.15) has distinguished between
four different
models that have been employed in Australian structural
reform:
‘Merger/amalgamation’, where two or more councils are consolidated
into a single
larger local authority; ‘significant boundary change’, where the
spatial area of
municipal jurisdictions is altered substantially; ‘resource sharing
through service
agreements’, in which one local authority undertake specific
functions for other
councils, like strategic planning and waste management; and
‘resource sharing
thorough joint enterprise’, in which municipalities combine their
activities in a
given service function in order to reap scale economies, such as
official recordhas been demonstrated both in Australia and
elsewhere that not
only do many of the claims asserted by proponents of municipal
consolidation lack
credible empirical support in the literature, but even the more
plausible benefits
purportedly flowing from council amalgamations have often been
overstated
(Dollery and Crase 2004). If this argument is accepted, and the
chief weapon in the
armoury of Australian state and territory local government policy
makers is indeed
defective in achieving its intended outcomes, then what can be said
of structural
reform programs that employ either the threat of forced
amalgamation or reward
councils that consolidate? Should they be viewed as ill conceived
and clumsy
efforts aimed at enhancing municipal efficiency that are doomed to
failure?TRUCTURAL REFORM IN AUSTRALIA
In its Local Government National Report 2003-04, the
Commonwealth
Department of Transport and Regional Services (DOTARS) (2005, p.66)
observed
that ‘a key feature of Australian local government reform has been
the use of
council amalgamations as the primary policy tool in the search for
more cost
effective local services’. Moreover, during ‘the 80 years from
Federation to 1991,
the number of councils in Australia fell by over 20 per cent’ and
‘in the 13 years
since 1991, council numbers have fallen by a further 27 per cent’.
An aggregated
We have seen that the proposition that ‘bigger is better’ in local
government has
informed Australian local government policy formulation for a very
long time.
Furthermore, advocates of municipal amalgamation typically contend
that existing
empirical evidence supports this proposition. For instance, in its
1997-98 Local
Government National Report, the Commonwealth National Office of
Local
Government (1998, pp.51-2) argued that the Commonwealth
government
financially assisted structural reform in local governance
involving municipal
amalgamation for three principal reasons. Firstly, ‘larger councils
have a more
secure and adequate financial base; are better able to plan and to
contribute to
economic development; are more effective community advocates; and
interact
more effectively with government and business’. In essence, this
argument invokes
the notion that small local authorities lack administrative and
technical capacity
compared with larger municipalities. Secondly, because the
Commonwealth
Financial Assistance Grants constitute about ten per cent of
council income,
councils must ‘deliver value-for-money services to local
communities’, and
because ‘structural reform delivers economies of scale and permits
counci
However, the 1997-98 Report did acknowledge a negative dimension
to
structural reform, albeit with several caveats. For example, it
noted that ‘structural
reform does have some perceived negatives’, including ‘diminished
communities
of interest and voter representation’, potential ‘dominance of one
area over
another’ and attendant ‘loss of identity’. Moreover, the Report
acknowledged that
‘amalgamations are unlikely to be viable for sparsely populated
councils in remote
areas’, although it added that many rural shires that ‘serve very
small populations
over relatively small areas which are not in remote localities’
would stand to gain
from amalgamation with adjacent councils because ‘larger and better
resourced
councils’ are able to ‘better identify community needs’, ‘better
articulate
community views’, ‘improve community involvement in decision
making’, ‘boost
local economic development’, ‘take a more strategic approach to
urban design