You are given the market demand function. Q = 2200 - 1000p and that each duopoly...

You are given the market demand function.

Q = 2200 - 1000_p

and that each duopoly firm's marginal cost is $0.07 per unit, which implies the cost function:

C (q_i) = 0.07q_i,

assuming no fixed for i = 1,2.

The Cournot Equilibrium quantities are q₁ = _______ and q₂=______ (enter your response as whole numbers).

The Cournot Equilibrium price is $_______ (round to the nearest penny).

Calculate the Cournot profits: firm 1 $______ and firm 2 $______ (round both responses to the nearest cent).

Solutions

Expert Solution

Rahul Sunny answered 2 years ago

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