In: Economics
PAYMENTS IN A NEW DEMOCRACY A country in Africa has recently undergone a revolution and is now governed by a popular democracy. In the past, all economic activity was undertaken by the autocratic leadership and their facilities, which no longer exist. The population of the country only survived in the past via various forms of barter, but now have to understand and establish modern functioning payment facilities. Start the process of understanding by describing some of the basics of payment in a letter to the revolutionary council.
describe how the payment system would conceptually work (2 typed page)
Events in the post-cold war era have highlighted the importance of demilitarisation and human security as central to the formation of an agenda for global peace and development. Protracted situations of intra-state, regionalized, and international armed conflict, the difficult nature of democratization processes, events of 9/11 and the ‘war on terror’, as well as renewed discussions about nuclear capability and threats are indicative of the frail advances in the areas of demilitarisation and enhancement of human security. Demilitarisation is a process whereby political, societal, environmental, economic, and security issues can be addressed in nonviolent and non-militaristic ways via constructive conflict management approaches. As Alex de Waal notes, ‘The values of militarisation affect not just soldiers but all members of society’,1 indicating that militarisation extends to domains other than security. For example, in politics, it can play a role in transitions from (civilian or military) authoritarianism to more democratic ways of rule. A resurgence of coups d’état in Africa during the early 2000s (including in Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, and Togo) is evidence of this. Militarisation is not, however, a feature unique to democratizing countries. The al-Qaida attacks of September 11, 2001, on the United States and the ensuing adoption of a militarised response under the guise of a ‘war on terror’ has resulted in some instances in the sidelining of human rights and demonstrate that established democracies can also be prone to militarist responses. In light of this, de Waal’s notion of ‘demilitarizing the mind’ appears to assume renewed meaning and relevance in contemporary politics.2 Although some object to conceptualizing demilitarisation from a multidimensional viewpoint, it arguably allows for greater understanding of its inherent challenges and potentialities as a tool to promote human security. Within post-conflict settings, demilitarisation is an aim to be achieved through a variety of processes within the broader remit of peacebuilding. In ‘The Security-Development Nexus and the Imperative of Peacebuilding with Special Reference to the African Context’, Theo Neethling argues that peacebuilding represents the core challenge to African countries because it is where durable peace, long-term security, and sustainable development become intertwined. In Africa, early approaches to demilitarisation have focused on reductions in military expenditures, personnel, and force projections in pursuit of an economically based peace dividend, as explained by Geoff Harris.3 Such parsimonious endeavors were met with resistance from the military institutions of African countries, which experienced simultaneous military, economic, social, and political transitions giving rise to complex peacebuilding processes. These efforts comprised, among others, the need to address such interrelated challenges as transforming mindsets towards interacting in a socially peaceful manner and tackling rising levels of criminality, rehabilitation of the most war-affected communities, and the reintegration of ex-combatants. After almost a decade of being associated with the expanded, non-statist and nonmilitary concept of security, and after growing awareness of the nexus between security and development, demilitarisation came to be understood as a corollary of processes centrally located within this interface, along with disarmament, demobilisation, reinsertion, and reintegration (DDRR) and security system reform (SSR). It is in the interface between security and development that demilitarisation and human security meet, insofar as they share the goal of creating a secure environment for achieving freedom from fear and from want, as stated in the UN secretary-general’s report ‘In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All’.4 The absence of fear and having one's needs met represent the security and development dimensions at the core of the peacebuilding enterprise, that is, the need to achieve the shorter-term goal of stability while planting the seeds for longer-term development. For example, as Daniel Vencovsky stresses in ‘Economic Reintegration of Ex-Combatants’, in regard to DDRR this means that more attention needs to be devoted to the neglected aspects of reinsertion and reintegration, here focusing on the need to create peaceful and sustainable income-generating activities (to prevent combatants from resorting to violence as a means of earning a living). The idea of addressing the security-development nexus seems, however, to be more enshrined in discourse and policy suggestions than in practice. The United Kingdom Department for International Development, in ‘Development and Security Working Together,’ a chapter from ‘Fighting Poverty to Build a Safer World’, notes the lack of adequate collaboration between those working in development, defense, and diplomacy and their differing perspectives on important issues, including time frames. A report of the International Peace Academy further develops this line of argument in ‘The SecurityDevelopment Nexus: Conflict, Peace, and Development in the 21st Century’.5 Necla Tschirgi proffers in ‘The Security-Development Nexus: From Rhetoric to Understanding Complex Dynamics’ that despite a growing convergence in the strategies of development and security actors working in conflict-ridden environments, such collaboration does not automatically spur effective conflict management outcomes. In addition, she raises the point that more attention needs to be devoted to understanding the inherently political nature of the peacebuilding agenda and the relationship between international and local actors. Peter Middlebrook and Gordon Peake, in ‘Right-Financing Security Sector Reform’, capture well the role of the international community in peacebuilding. According to them, ‘The needs assessments often are followed by poorly sequenced external assistance. . . . This leads to the “projectization” of the national budget, the emergence of parallel delivery systems, and a second civil service—the aid community’. This highlights the need to firmly question and deconstruct the widely touted notions of participation and local ownership, while at the same time enquiring into their undermining effect on, for example, the idea that Africa needs to develop its own SSR vision, as argued by Martin Rupiya in ‘An African Perspective of the Reform of the Security Sector Since the 1990s’. As demonstrated by Eboe Hutchful in ‘A Civil Society Perspective’, the obstacle to building and sustaining an African SSR vision lies partly in the ability to find executive, legislative, and civil society actors that are thoroughly committed to developing and implementing such a vision at the local, national, and regional levels. A larger issue extends beyond the well-intentioned endeavor of achieving lasting peace through demilitarisation and human security to address the equation of conflict, security, and development. This agenda, while increasingly gaining in importance, has not been a priority of the international community, which has experienced a resurgence of militaristic and interventionist approaches in response to globalized challenges to power. This state of affairs, coupled with sustained economic hardship over the years and the recent financial crisis, continues to alienate those most in need of peace and security, thereby undermining the joint processes of responding adequately to conflict and insecurity while fostering development.
RR programmes across Africa have suffered from a lack of and delays in donor attention are devoted to reintegration into agriculture, micro-enterprise creation, and projects that benefit both ex-combatants and local communities. Reinsertion The first step in RR is reinsertion assistance, also known as the transitional ‘safety net’. It aims to bridge the gap between demobilization and lasting reintegration. It is usually targeted for a period of six to twelve months after demobilization and can comprise both monetary contributions and in-kind entitlements, such as clothing, basic household goods, hygiene products and baby-care kits. The precise format of reinsertion assistance is a subject of contention and the benefits and drawbacks of monetary assistance and non-liquid aid have been hotly debated among academics and practitioners. The second point of contention centers on the form of the payment of cash assistance, which can be disbursed either as a lump sum or in installments over an extended period of time. These debates are explored below.
The advantages of cash payments include relative logistical simplicity and the resultant cost-effectiveness, flexibility for beneficiaries, stimulation of local trading systems, and increased attractiveness of the DDRR process and resulting acceleration of the peace process. Counter-arguments stress that cash may fuel funding and operational difficulties due to inadequate design. This article aims to contribute to the improvement of the RR component in DDRR programmes in Africa by identifying the main lessons learned from DDRR experiences in West Africa and the DRC. The article first reviews two debates surrounding reinsertion assistance. First, it explores whether this should take the form of a cash payment or in-kind assistance, and secondly, whether cash payments should be made as a lump sum or in a number of installments over a longer period of time. The article proceeds by reviewing the success of stop-gap projects (interim projects between demobilization and reintegration) and suggests that these projects can have a significant positive impact. As regards reintegration modalities, this paper criticises some common deficiencies in the design of vocational training programmes, namely lack of consideration for the attributes of the post-conflict labour market, and suggests that more international arms markets [sic], it can pose a security risk for beneficiaries, it can be easily extorted by former commanders, it can be used to rearm, it can accelerate inflation and if markets are disrupted beneficiaries may not be able to purchase objects of daily use. Porous borders, the wide availability of weapons across Africa, and the different value of reinsertion assistance in various countries may result in the creation of regional arms flows: it has been noted that reinsertion assistance in Côte d’Ivoire was in excess of US$ 900, while in Liberia ex-fighters were offered a total of US$ 300 only. The use of cash also increases the likelihood of DDRR being perceived as a cash-for-arms scheme. This approach creates expectations that may prove difficult to manage. DDRR in Liberia in 2003–2004 resulted in violence and the temporary suspension of the process due to unsatisfied expectations of ex-combatants. In addition, due to the widespread proliferation of small arms, weapons can be easily reacquired. It has been suggested that DDRR should embrace a development-for-arms approach and make cash assistance conditional on participation in the longer-term reintegration process, as is being attempted in Liberia.5 Lump Sum Versus Instalments The second dilemma centers on the disbursement of cash assistance as a lump sum or in a number of installments. Proponents of lump sum payment argue that it is logistically easier and offers a resource that can be invested in productive ways thus going beyond reinsertion itself and providing an instrument of reintegration. Critics argue that a lump sum payment may be squandered on alcohol and objects of short-term benefit, may pose a security risk for recipients, and increases inflationary pressures. Logistics have presented a daunting challenge in the DRC due to the size of the country and the high number of ex-combatants to be catered for (77 000 as of June 2006). DDRR in the DRC has utilized both approaches (at differing points in time): a larger initial payment followed by twelve smaller monthly installments or two larger lump sum payments. The DRC has utilized cutting-edge technological innovations to deal with these challenges. A mobile phone operated payment system has been devised. Payments are verified via a mobile phone network and cash is released in a mobile phone outlet, where the immediate funds come from local sales of mobile phone services. The sum is later reimbursed by the government. Installments paid over a period of time have the advantage of embedding reinsertion into a process and their payment can be made conditional on participation in reintegration activities and decreased over time in order to phase out dependency. This would contribute towards entrenching payments into the development-for-arms approach.
Stop-Gap Projects The void between demobilization and reintegration can also be filled by stop-gap projects. These are “short-term interventions that can help ensure a smoother transition from demobilization to reintegration. Stop-gap projects implemented through community-based activities in sensitive and strategic areas can help reintegrate ex-combatants into the community by creating short-term jobs, whilst they wait to enter longer-term reintegration programmes.”7 Stop-gap projects, also known as quick impact projects (QIPs) in the peacekeeping mission setting, offer a number of benefits: they contribute to the short-term economic well-being of ex-combatants, they can involve skills transfer and if conducted in conjunction with employing the local civilian workforce, and for the purpose of infrastructure and amenity renovation, they can also contribute to community reconstruction and reconciliation. Stop-gap projects have been successfully used in various post-conflict environments throughout Africa. In the DRC, the United Nations peacekeeping mission (MONUC), as well as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), have been using interim reintegration projects. In Sierra Leone, the UN peacekeeping mission (UNAMSIL) employed around 6 000 ex-fighters, together with 1 500 community members in short-term infrastructure reconstruction and agricultural development QIPs. Ex-combatants and civilians were encouraged to take meals together and engage in sports activities, thus positively impacting on economic reconstruction as well as reconciliation. Various international and domestic organizations have successfully run reconstruction projects that employed both ex-combatants and community members in various countries.8 It is apparent that stop-gap projects can have substantial positive benefits. Their increased use in the pre-reintegration stage (if they are used as a means of paying ex-combatants for the work they carry out rather than offering them reinsertion payments) could not only embed reinsertion assistance into the development-for-arms approach, but also aid later reintegration due to skills transfer, reconciliation and reconstruction, which is a precondition for later economic development.
In concluding, it can be summarised that reinsertion cash payments should be spread over a period of time and tied to participation in reintegration programmes, and possibly be taken as a wage for participation in community reconstruction projects. Stop-gap projects play a vital role in providing interim sources of income before reintegration efforts can take effect and can positively contribute to community reconstruction and reconciliation. Reintegration has to better assess vocational training options offered to ex-combatants and more attention should be given to truly viable reintegration options, such as agriculture and stimulation of micro-enterprise. The community-based approach should be utilized wherever financial capabilities allow.