What co-operation strategies should be adopted at the international level?
In: Economics
A market is served by three firms. The market demand curve is p = 200-y. Each firm incurs a constant cost per unit of $40.
What is the market price at cournot equilbrium and what is firm 3's cournot reaction function?
In: Economics
Explain some of the costs of hyperinflation, If they are so costly to an economy why do they occur?
In: Economics
Using the AD AS model, explain what will happen to the price level and real GDP if either the SRAS or AD curve shifts. You are told that 2 events take place and you must explain which curve shifts and in what direction.
In: Economics
An economy has full-employment output of 1500. Suppose desired
consumption and desired investment are
?? = 125 + 0.75(? − ?) − 400?
?? = 200 − 100?
G is the level of government purchases, and T=100
Money demand is
?? ?
= 0.8? − 2000(? + ??)
where the expected rate of inflation, ??, is 0.05. The nominal
supply of money M = 2000.
2. Asset market equilibrium and the LM curve.
i) Derive the LM curve when the price level is equal to the
solution in part (h) [Hint: Use the price level from the part (2-h)
to get the real money supply]
Solution in part H is P = $2
In: Economics
1. Firm I has variable cost VCi = yi^2/10 and fixed cost FCi = 2000.
(1) Find total cost Ci(yi), average cost ACi, marginal cost Mci and the firm supply function Si(p)
(2) There are n=50 firms identical to firm I, facing a market demand of D(p) = 1000-250p. Find the market supply function S(p), the market equilibrium price p*, the market equilibrium quantity Y*.
(3) Given price p* you found in part b, what is the profit maximising yi* that firm i produces? How much profit does firm i make?
In: Economics
Subject: Engineering Economics
Use an interest rate of 5% for the loan
The Owls Engineering firm has been invited to participate in remodeling the Engineering Research Center at Temple University and need to acquire a crane with a cost of $250,000. The cost of transporting the crane to Temple University is $75,000. The project is expected to last four years and at that time the cranes will be sold at an expected salvage value of $100,000. The crane has MACRS-GDS 5-year property class. The engineering firm will finance the crane with a loan to be paid with four equal principal payments plus interest every year at a rate of 5% per year. The engineering firm will receive for their services a payment of $200,000 the first year increasing 3% per year thereafter. Their O&M costs are expected to be $50,000 the first year increasing by $10,000 every year. The payment of $200,000 in the first years is subject to meet deadlines and can vary + - 30% depending on the progress of the project. Therefore, the O&M will also be affected by progress of the project within a range +-30%. Perform an ATCF sensitivity analysis to determine if the project is economically feasible for the engineering firm. The firm MARR is 10% and tax is 35%.
In: Economics
In: Economics
In: Economics
In: Economics
Select a proprietary or non-proprietary Customer Relationship Management (CRM) system used by an industry or a business entity in Malaysia, analyze and evaluate the relevant operational; analytic; and collaborative functions of the chosen CRM and highlight their benefits to that particular industry or a business entity. (explain in detail)
In: Economics
A government is running a balanced budget. An election is approaching and the government decides on a one-time, temporary, massive tax cut that will cut tax revenue by $50 billion in one year; after the year is over, tax rates and tax revenue return to normal. The government decides to issue perpetual bonds of $50 billion to cover the cost of the tax cut. The interest rate on these bonds is constant at 6%. The tax to pay the interest in the future will be levied onthe private sector. Suppose that half of the population plans ahead and wants to leave enough in bequests to the next generation so that they are not harmed by future higher taxes. The other half of the population spends all they can now. a. What is the impact of the tax cut on domestic saving? b. What happens to consumption? c. Who buys the $50 billion of debt?.
In: Economics
In: Economics
In: Economics
1. Consider the following game, which illustrates Nobel Laureate Thomas Schelling's solution to the problem of how a kidnapped person can induce a kidnapper to release him after the person has learned the identity of the kidnapper.
The game starts off with the kidnapper, say Alex, deciding whether or not to kidnap Bart. If he decides not to kidnap Bart, the game ends. Alex gets a payoff of 3, while Bart receives a payoff of 5. However, if Alex decides to go through with the kidnapping, he is successful, but there is a scuffle in which he is unmasked, so that his identity is revealed to Bart. This creates another problem for Bart, since Alex would now be inclined to kill Bart since Bart, if released could identify Alex to the police. Bart then decides whether to reveal something compromising/incriminating about himself to Alex that is not known to the rest of the world. (For example he could have embezzled funds from the company he works in or has had an extramarital affair his wife does not know about. Effectively, he is offering this secret as a "collateral" which Alex can use to ensure his silence). Whether or not Bart decides to tell his secret, Alex has to decide to either kill him or release him. If he kills Bart the game ends and payoffs to Alex and Bart are respectively 4 and 0. If he releases Bart, then Bart has to decide whether to tell the police or not. If Bart does not tell the police the game ends and payoffs to Alex and Bart are respectively 5 and 2. If Bart chooses to tell the police, however, there are two scenarios to consider. If he hasn't revealed his incriminating secret to Bart, the game ends and the payoffs to Alex and Bart are 1 and 4 respectively. But if he has revealed his secret to Alex, then Alex has to decide whether to reveal that secret to the world. If he does then the game ends and payoffs are 2 to Alex and 1 to Bart. If he doesn't the game ends with payoff of 1 to Alex and 3 to Bart.
(a) Draw the extensive (tree) form of the game. How many strategies do Alex and Bart have? Write them down. {Hint: In doing so do not forget that a strategy is a complete plan of action.}
(b) Now present the game in strategic form. {Hint: The payoff table is pretty big! J } Identify all of the Nash equilibria in this game.
(c) Which of these equilibria is the subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE)? Explain and illustrate your answer using backward induction on the game tree.
(d) Pick any two of the other Nash equilibria that are not SPNE. Discuss the credibility problems associated with these equilibria.
In: Economics