The price of a large pizza decreased from $14.00 to $10.00. As a result, the quantity demanded of skateboards increased from 310.00 to 330.00.
a. Using the midpoint formula, what is the percentage change observed for the price of a large pizza? (Give your answer to two decimal places)
b.Using the midpoint formula, what is the percentage change observed for the quantity demanded of skateboards? (Give your answer to two decimal places.)
c.What is the cross-price elasticity of demand between pizzas and skateboards? (Give your answer to two decimal places.)
In: Economics
In: Economics
1. Given the following, depict fully and explain break-even in units, break-even in dollars, total revenue line, total cost line, fixed cost line, break-even point, etc.
Fixed Cost: $120,000
Sales per Unit: $15.00
Variable cost per Unit: $3.00
Include a discussion regarding sensitivity analysis for an inelastic product.
In: Economics
In: Economics
In many countries, armed forces rely both on volunteers and conscription for military service. For example, in Denmark, eligible men for military service are required to draw a number. Depending on the number they draw, they may get drafted if there aren't enough volunteers.
Consider a very simple game with two risk-neutral players, who are eligible for military service.[1]The Army needs only one of them.
Player 1 moves first, and decides whether or not to volunteer.
If Player 1 volunteers, then the game ends. Player 1 receives a payoff of (B -C), where B represents the benefit of volunteering and C represent the cost of joining the army, respectively. (You can think of both monetary and non-monetary benefits and costs). In this case, Player 2 gets a payoff of zero.
If Player 1 does not volunteer, then Player 2, who observes this decision, decides whether or not to volunteer.
Similarly, if Player 2 volunteers, the game ends with leaving Player 2 a payoff of (B -C), whereas Player 1 obtains a payoff of 0. If Player 2 does not volunteer either, then the army drafts one of the players with the luck of the draw. Therefore, Player 1 and Player 2 gets drafted with an equal probability. 0.5. As the result of the draw, the player who ends up being drafted receives a payoff of –C (since the benefits of volunteering does not accrue in this case). The player who ends up not being drafted receives a payoff of 0.
a) I suggest for you to start by drawing the game tree, using
Nature as a non-strategic player representing the (possible)
uncertainty in the game. You do NOT need to turn this tree in, but
it will be helpful to sketch it out.
b) Let B=400 and C=600. What is the rollback
equilibrium of this game? [10 points]
c) Does this game with the payoff structure described in (b) exhibit first-mover advantage, second-mover advantage, or neither? Explain. [10 points]
d) Now consider that Player 2 has a different value of C than Player 1. Determine the minimum value of C, which makes the following commitment credible: “I will not volunteer regardless of what you do.” [10 points]
e) Choose a larger value of C than you found in part (d), and solve the game for rollback equilibrium. Is the equilibrium outcome different than the one you have described in part (b)? [10 points]
In: Economics
Limitations: Fiscal policy vs Monetary Policy
Key Question:
1. What are the limitations of Fiscal policy?
2. What are the limitations of Monetary policy?
3. Which policy do you think is the most effective out of the two policies (Fiscal or Monetary policy). Why do you think so?
In: Economics
Review Handout | Absolute Advantage and Comparative Advantage | Cases 1-3 (3 pages)
*Holding other things constant and considering the usual assumptions for the 2C-2G-1F model and production per unit of labor for both Case 1 and Case 2 below, determine which country has the absolute advantage and comparative advantage in which good.
Example Case 1
Country |
Good X |
Good Y |
Opp. Cost of X in term of Good Y? |
Opp. Cost of Y in terms of Good X? |
Country A |
60 60 /60 =1 60/80 = 3/4 |
80 80 /60 =4/3 80/80 = 1 |
4/3 (=1.33) |
¾ = 0.75 |
Country B |
35 |
70 |
To determine who has a comparative advantage in which good, we will need to calculate opportunity costs of good X and good Y in each country first.
In the case of Country A above, the opp. cost of X (in terms of Y) is the number of units of Good Y Country A should give up in order to produce one more unit of Good X. To find out this, we can simply divide the number of Good X and Good Y per unit of labor in each cell by 60, respectively, so that we can see how many units of Good Y Country A should give up to produce one more unit of Good X in Country A. As shown above, it will be 1.33.
By the same token, in the case of Country A, the opp. cost of Y (in terms of X) is the number of units of Good X Country A should give up in order to produce one more unit of Good Y. To find out this, we can simply divide the number of Good Y and Good X per unit of labor in each cell by 80, respectively, so that we can see how many units of Good X Country A should give up to produce one more unit of Good Y in Country A. As shown above, it will be 0.75.
Hint) Per unit of labor, which country is producing Good X (Good Y) more in absolute terms?
Case 2
Country |
Barrels of Wine |
Bales of Wool |
Opp. Cost of Wine? |
Opp. Cost of Wool? |
Portugal |
20 |
20 |
||
The U.K. |
40 |
80 |
Case 3. Now assume that country “American” can produce either 20 songs or 40 boxes of roses per week. Assume that country “Eagle” can produce 10 songs or 50 boxes of roses per week. Consider the usual assumptions holding other things constant.
Country |
Songs |
Roses |
Opp. Cost of Songs |
Opp. Cost of Roses |
American |
20 |
40 |
||
Eagle |
10 |
50 |
Country |
Songs |
Roses |
American |
||
Eagle |
||
Total |
Country |
Songs |
Roses |
American |
||
Eagle |
||
Total |
In: Economics
Efficiency wages are defined as wages that are intentionally above market rates. This practice is sometimes cited within the macroeconomics literature as a basis for sticky wages in the short run. One explanation for efficiency wages derives from incomplete information. In a world of complete information, firms could structure compensation contracts to directly reward high effort and punish low effort. However, in a world of incomplete information, monitoring is difficult and costly.
Consider a worker that must make a choice between putting in high effort on the job and putting in low effort on the job (a.k.a. shirking). If the worker puts in high effort, he/she keeps the jobwith certainty and earns w. If the worker puts in low effort (shirks), then he/she earns G, the gain from shirking. The probability that the firm catches the worker shirking is f, in which case the worker is fired, and he/she must take a new job at the market wage m. If the firm does not catch the worker shirking, then he/she continues to earn w.
(a) Construct an extensive-form representation of this game where the firm makes the first move by offering a wage w.
(b) Write down the payoff to the worker from putting in high effort and the expected payoff to the worker from shirking.
(c) What incentive compatibility constraint must be met for the worker to choose to put in high effort?
(d) Describe the relationship between the firm’s optimal choice of w and G, all else equal.
(e) Describe the relationship between the firm’s optimal choice of w and f, all else equal.
In: Economics
Has the Federal Reserve done more harm than good? This is not a simple yes or no question. I need you to fully explain your answer with at least one source cited.
Response must be at least 250 words
In: Economics
2. Which of the following costs are always increasing as output increases? (a) Variable Cost only (b) Fixed Cost only (c) Marginal Cost only (d) Total Cost only (e) Total Cost and Variable Cost
3.A firm has a Cobb-Douglas production function ? = 50√ ??. This function exhibits a constant return to scale. The total cost function for this production process is ? ? = ? · √ ?·? 50 , where ? is output level, ? and ? are prices of labor and capital. The marginal cost of production for this function is: (a) Constant. (b) Increasing. (c) Decreasing. (d) None of the above.
4. If some production function ?(?, ?) exhibits an increasing return to scale, then the marginal cost of production decreases as output level increases. (a) True. (b) False. (c) Not enough information given. (d) None of the above.
5. It will never cost more to produce a certain amount of output in the long run than in the short run. (a) True. (b) False. (c) Not enough information given. (d) None of the above.
In: Economics
why might it be better for governments to borrow money from foreign countries or entities than borrowing domestically
In: Economics
Why is it important to study the internal resources, capabilities, and activities of firms? What insights can be gained?
In: Economics
The inverse market demand for clothing is P=48–2Q and the cost function is C=Q2.
1 Calculate the optimal profit of a monopolist.
Assume now that the monopolist can choose whether to continue operating in the market as a monopolist or set up two branches that operate in the market as Cournot duopolists (duopolist branching). Each branch will face the same quadratic cost function as the original monopolist.
2 Calculate the optimal profit under the duopoly branching. Will the firm prefer to produce with one or two branches? Explain whether this is counter intuitive.
3 Every unit of output Q generates a social cost of 10. The government chooses to pass on that cost to the firm as a lump sum to pay. In this situation, does the firm prefer to produce with one or with two branches operating as Cournot duopolists?
In: Economics
Income: The 5 boroughs: Manhattan, Bronx, Queens, Brooklyn, Staten Island. (Census)
a) Make a graph comparing the poverty rate for all people in the 5 boroughs.
b) Make a graph comparing the median 2016 household incomes in the 5 boroughs.
c) Provide data analysis in 2-4 sentences
In: Economics
_____ 1. Which of the following statements about a monopoly is false?
_____ 2. Which of the following statements about externalities is true?
TRUE FALSE
TRUE FALSE
TRUE FALSE
TRUE FALSE
In: Economics