Prove that in a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of a finite
strategic game, all the pure strategies that are assigned positive
probabilities must have the same expected payoff.
In the following games indicate any pure strategy Nash
equilibria that exist. Then find the mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium for each game.
Player 2
Left Colum | Center Column | Right Column
U 100,0
25,75
0, 100
M 25,75
100, 0
25, 75
D 0,100
25, 75
100, 0
Find ALL Nash Equilibria (pure strategy and mixed) of the
following games. Also identify the efficient outcome of each
game:
a)
Player 2
Left
Right
Player 1
Up
5,6
4,9
Down
7,7
3,8
b)
Player 2
Left
Right
Player 1
Up
4,3
1,10
Down
2,5
4,2
c)
Player 2
Left
Right
Player 1
Up
5,5
4,4
Down
4,2
7,3
2. Find all of the PURE STRATEGY Nash Equilibria to the
following game:
Player 2
Left
Center
Right
Player 1
Up...
SUBJECT; GAME THEORY
Consider the following pricing game
James
Dean
Swerve (q)
Straight (1-q)
Swerve (p)
0,0
-1,1
Straight (1-p)
2,-1
-2,-2
PLEASE EXPLAIN IN DETAIL.
Find the mixed-strategy equilibrium in this game, including the
expected payoffs for the players.
Discuss the Nash equilibrium and Mixed Strategy Nash
equilibrium.
a) Provide the definitions.
b) Provide two games, and illustrate the Nash equilibrium /
equilibria
and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium / equilibria for those
games.
Plz use both pure NE and MIXED strategy (with Probability)
Consider a firm with two agents – 1 and 2. Both agents have to
choose between two options: Client Focus or Cost Focus. If both
choose Client the payoffs to 1 are 20 and 10 to agent 2. If both
agents choose to play Cost the payoffs are 15 to agent 1 and 25 to
agent 2, respectively. Finally, if any other combination of actions
is chosen the payoffs to...
Find all Nash equilibria in the following three
simultaneous-move games:
Game 1 :
Column
Left Center Right
Up 3,1 4,2 3,3
High 5,7 1,3 2,4
Low 6,1 2,5 3,4
Down 1,1 4,6 5,2
Game 2:
Left Right
Up 2,4 7,7
Down 3,12 5,8
Game 3:
Left Right
Up 2,4 3,3
Down . 6,0 1,5