In: Operations Management
Question
What modes of entry did GM and Uber choose to pursue as they
expanded into China? Why did they choose these? Also think about
how the state owned SAIC (meaning that SAIC is partly owned by the
Chinese government) reduced government challenges to GM’s entry
into China.
Answer
GM - China Entry through JV Model
General Motors (GM) entered the Chinese automotive market through
joint ventures with Chinese companies. Shanghai GM was a JV
partnership with the Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation
(SAIC) in 1995.
Uber – China Entry through Greenfield Model
Uber entered the Chinese market with a Greenfield model in 2004, through Uber China as a subsidiary company, which was established and launched operations in Beijing and Shanghai.
Reason for GM
In 1994, when the Chinese authorities began the task of making
China's automotive sector one of the country's strongest
industries, the automobile market was opened to the foreign
companies. But the access to the market came with a rider –
technology transfer to the local companies. SO practically if
Chinese government made it clear that entering into automobile
market in China is bound to be through joint ventures between
foreign companies with local entities. General Motors (GM) entered
the Chinese automotive market through joint ventures with SAIC in
1955. Eventually GM got the permission to set up a manufacturing
unit investing between $1 billion and $2 billion to manufacture
mid-sized cars in China. But the company's Chinese odyssey has not
been very smooth. It not only had to deal with fluctuating car
demand but also with its joint venture partners who proved to be
tough negotiators. Despite the problems, GM continued to focus on
China and the perseverance seemed to pay off with the company
tripling its sales in 2003.
Reason for Uber
Since Uber is the first platform provider that launched the
‘ride-hailing service’ even before this term appeared in the news
and media, its brand power is a very powerful and driving force for
its business growth. In fact, as in ‘Google’ for Internet search,
Uber is almost synonymous with ride-hailing service. The brand
recognition reaches to over 40 million monthly users and the
service operates in 633 cities worldwide with high brand equity and
awareness. Thus, it was quite a natural decision for Uber to
penetrate the Chinese ride-hailing market rapidly through a
greenfield model.
However, Uber China failed in creating a winner-take-all situation
in the Chinese ride-hailing market, where there are huge potential
customers who are difficult to get a taxi, particularly in peak
hours. According to iResearch (2016), the number of users enjoying
the ride-hailing service reached 399 million in the Chinese market
by the end of 2015. And in the first quarter of 2016, Didi’s market
share (in terms of the order volume) reached 85.3%, ranking first
in the industry; on the other hand, Uber’s market share reached
only 14.9%, taking the second place (CNIT-Research, 2016). The big
difference in the market share implies that despite Uber’s strong
brand power in the global market, there were other factors in the
Chinese market which affected users’ choices of the ride-hailing
platforms. Now, we first propose the following factor about the
effect of the brand power on the Chinese ride-hailing market.