Question

in law and pubic affairs what are the statutory interpretation, write in one double spaced page ?

Answer 1

Courts may be called upon for the interpretation of a statute due to a dispute over the meaning of a word or phrase contained within a statute. These disputes may arise because of different reasons. It has been held that words are an imperfect ways of communication. Omissions may have occurred at the time of drafting stage, word, phrase ambiguity, etymological change through time, oversight on specific points, or a failure to adapt legislation.

This may result in the judiciary to provide a role in statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation is the process of determining the true meaning of a written document. The Interpretation Act 1978 provides limited scope to assist judges with statutory interpretation and only standard definitions to common provisions such as a rebuttable presumption that terminology in the masculine gender also include the feminine, and that the singular includes plural.

There are three main rules to interpret a statute as mentioned below:

1. Literal Rule

2. Golden Rule

3. Mischief Rule

And also the integrated approach, known as the purposive approach. Each rule will be looked at individually with case examples.

The literal rule uses the plain ordinary meaning of words. In Fisher v Bell [1960] 3 All ER 731 the defendant, a shopkeeper, displayed in his window a flick knife with a price tag, and was prosecuted for OFFERING FOR SALE an offensive weapon contrary to the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959. The High Court said the phrase OFFER FOR SALE was to be taken literally, in accordance with its meaning in contract law, and that the shopkeeper’s display of the weapon was no more than an invitation to treat. It was presumed that parliamentary draftsmen know technical legal language thus common law expression was not altered.

The golden rule is an extension of the literal rule and has both a narrow and wider application and is used where the literal rule creates an absurdity. This is evident in the narrow sense in Adler v George [1964] All ER 628. Adler gained access to a RAF station and obstructed a member of Her Majesty’s forces engaged in security duties IN THE VICINITY of a prohibited place. He argued that, as he was actually in the prohibited place, he could not be said to be in the vicinity of the prohibited place. The literal interpretation of the Official Secrets Act 1920 would allow protesters to demonstrate within military bases but not outside them, creating an absurdity. This was clearly not the intention of this Act. Adler was found guilty of the offense because IN THE VICINITY of should be interpreted to mean on or near the prohibited place. In its wider sense, the court may modify the reading of words in order to avoid a repugnant situation as in Re Sigsworth [1935] Ch 89. Section 46 of the Administration of Estates Act 1925 stated that where a person dies intestate leaving children but no spouse, the estate passes to the children. The defendant had murdered his mother, who did not have a will, and he stood to inherit her estate as next of kin. The court applied the golden rule and held that “issue” would not be entitled to inherit where they had killed the deceased.

The mischief rule gives judges slightly more discretion power. It looks at the gap or the mischief the statute was intended to cover. In the case of Corkery v Carpenter [1951] 1 KB 102, the Licensing Act 1872 stipulated that it was an offense to be drunk in charge of a carriage. Whilst no direct reference was made to bicycles, the court ruled that Corkery was guilty as the term CARRIAGE could also be applied to a bicycle.

As per Lord Dennings judgement in Notham v London Borough of Barnet [1978] 1 WLR 220, the purposive approach is one that will “promote the general legislative purpose underlying the provisions”. The purposive approach is used by the majority of European countries when interpreting their own legislation and also by the European Court of Justice in interpreting European Union law and is becoming increasingly influential. In Jones v Tower Boot Co Ltd (1997) IRLR 168 CA, the complainant suffered racial abuse at work, which he claimed amounted to racial discrimination for which the employers were liable under sec 32 of the Race Relations Act 1976. The Court of Appeal applied the purposive approach and held that the acts of discrimination were committed in the course of employment is to be given an everyday, rather than a tort law, meaning. Any other interpretation ran counter to the whole legislative scheme and underlying policy of sec 32.

In addition, the courts may also apply rules of language, intrinsic, extrinsic, and presumptions to aid statutory interpretation. There are three main rules of language as described below:

1. Ejusdem generis meaning of the same kind.

2. Noscitur a sociis meaning a word is known by the company it keeps.

3. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, where the express mention of one thing excludes others.

Intrinsic aids are taken from the Act itself and may include the long or short title of the Act, the preamble, headings, side notes and contextual punctuation.

Extrinsic aids are previous case law, international conventions, regulations and directives, dictionaries, official reports.

Presumptions within law are numerous and may range from presumption against alterations of the common law to a presumption against ousting the jurisdiction of the courts, to name but a few.

The rules of statutory interpretation are not rules in the strict sense, as each one may point to different solution to the same problem. There is no hierarchy of rules to be applied and neither is any court bound to follow a particular rule. They are purely guidelines for the judiciary to solve problems with statutory interpretation.