Consider aduopolistic market wheredemand is given byP= 36 - 3Q, where Q = Q1 + Q2....

Consider aduopolistic market wheredemand is given byP= 36 - 3Q, where Q = Q1 + Q2. For each duopolist, the constant per unit marginal cost is $18/unit and fixed costs are zero. a. Assume first that the duopolists hold Cournot conjectures when they make their choices. Find the Cournot equilibrium price, quantity, and profits. b. Now find the equilibrium price, quantity, and profits assuming the duopolistic competition as Bertrand. c. Find the equilibrium um price, quantity, and profit for each firm, assuming the firms act as a Stackelberg leader and follower, with Firm 1 as the leader.

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Rahul Sunny answered 1 week ago

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