In: Economics
According to the consumer preference theory the subjective taste of a consumer is based on the amount of satisfaction they derive from a commodity, so if a consumer has three comodities A, B, and C, and they prefer A over B and B over C they'll rationally prefer A over C.
so in the question, voter 1 prefers candidate A over B and B over C so if there are only two candidates A and C the voter will prefer A over C.
Voter 2 prefers candidate B over C and C over A, therefore, he'll also prefer B over A.
Likewise Voter 3 prefers candidate C over A and A over B, thus he'll prefer C over A.
Now, according to the voting procedure only candidate A and B compete in the first round, thus voter 1 will vote for candidate A, voter 2 will vote for candidate B and voter 3 will vote for candidate A rationally considering their level of satisfaction, therefore candidate A wins the first round with 2 votes.
Now, for round 2 candidate C and the winner of the first round candidate A compete against each other.. here voter 1 votes for candidate A, voter 2 votes for candidate C and voter 3 votes for candidate C.
Thus the winner of round two will be candidate C with 2 votes.
Answer: If voters are strategic the voting outcome is that candidate C wins the elections. And in the winner for round 1 will be candidate A