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Assuming that a responder in the ultimatum game has Fehr-Schmidt inequity aversion utility, and the responder...


Assuming that a responder in the ultimatum game has Fehr-Schmidt inequity aversion utility, and the responder Is indifferent between accepting and rejecting a proposal to get $1 while the proposer keeps $9, find the responder's value of Alpha. Remember if the proposal is rejected, both people get zero dollars. Enter your answer as a decimal.

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Rahul Sunny answered 6 months ago
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