Question

In: Economics

Suppose the industry is currently unregulated and there are only 2 firms in the industry. Both...

Suppose the industry is currently unregulated and there are only 2 firms in the industry. Both firms are emitting 1,100 tons of pollution, thus total pollution in the industry is 2,200 tons.

The marginal cost of pollution reduction for the 2 firms are:

MCR1=1.35Q1andMCR2=0.85Q2


Now, suppose the government issued 700 permits to each firm (total pollution allowed in industry is 1,400 tons)

after trading what is the amount of pollution firm 1 will reduce?

Solutions

Expert Solution

The marginal cost of reduction of pollution of any identity is nothing but its demand for pollution. If we have marginal costs of pollution reduction for 2 firms, then we will find the aggregate costs of both by adding them up.

Similarly,

Adding both the quantites up, we get:

Government releases 700 permits for each firm. This does not mean that both will pollute 700 units and reduce the remaining. Rather, they will trade those permits with each other until efficient outcome is reached. A firm will buy a permit only if the price of that permit is lower than its marginal cost of reducing pollution. To find this, we equate the aggregate demand for pollution with the supply of pollution permits.

We get:

(rounded off)

At MCR = 729, Q1 will be:

540 units of pollution will be reduced by firm 1. This is the required answer.

Thanks!


Related Solutions

Suppose there are only two firms, firm1 and firm2, in the market. They both choose a...
Suppose there are only two firms, firm1 and firm2, in the market. They both choose a quantity to produce simultaneously. The market price is determined by the market demand: p =130-(Q1+Q2) where Q1 is the output quantity of firm1 and Q2 is the output quantity of firm2. Firm1’s total cost of production is 10Q1 and firm2’s total cost of production is 10Q2. That is, both firms have a constant marginal cost of 10. Task 1. What’s firm 1’s best response...
Suppose there are only two firms, firm1 and firm2, in the market. They both choose a...
Suppose there are only two firms, firm1 and firm2, in the market. They both choose a quantity to produce simultaneously. The market price is determined by the market demand: p =130-(Q1+Q2) where Q1 is the output quantity of firm1 and Q2 is the output quantity of firm2. Firm1’s total cost of production is 10Q1 and firm2’s total cost of production is 10Q2. That is, both firms have a constant marginal cost of 10. Task 1. What’s firm 1’s best response...
Suppose firm A and firm B are the only two firms in an industry. Each firm’s...
Suppose firm A and firm B are the only two firms in an industry. Each firm’s Marginal Abatement cost functions is given by: MACa = 200-Ea MACb = 200-2Eb Also, there are four people, each with marginal damage function: MDi = 1/3Et , Where Et = Ea+Eb a) What is the uncontrolled emission levels of each firm? b) Find the aggregate MAC function c) Find the aggregate MD function d) Determine the socially optimal level of emissions ?t ∗ and...
Suppose the natural gas industry consisted of only two firms. Let these firms have identical cost...
Suppose the natural gas industry consisted of only two firms. Let these firms have identical cost functions, C(q) = 40q. Assume the demand curve for the industry is given by P = 100 − Q and that each firm expects the other to behave as a Cournot competitor. a) Calculate the Cournot-Nash equilibrium for each firm, assuming that each chooses the output level that maximizes its profits when taking its rival’s output as given. What are the profits of each...
Suppose the airline industry consisted of only two​ firms: American and Texas Air Corp. Let the...
Suppose the airline industry consisted of only two​ firms: American and Texas Air Corp. Let the two firms have identical cost​ functions, ​C(q)=40q. Assume that the demand curve for the industry is given by P=130−Q and that each firm expects the other to behave as a Cournot competitor. Calculate the​ Cournot-Nash equilibrium for each​ firm, assuming that each chooses the output level that maximizes its profits when taking its​ rival's output as given. What are the profits of each​ firm?...
Suppose that two identical firms produce widgets and that they are the only firms in the...
Suppose that two identical firms produce widgets and that they are the only firms in the market. Their costs are given by C1 = 60 Q1 and C2 = 60 Q2 where Q1 is the output of Firm 1 and Q2 is the output of Firm 2. Price is determined by the following demand curve: P= 2100 − Q where Q=Q1+Q2 Find the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Calculate the profit of each firm at this equilibrium. (For all of the following, enter...
Suppose that two identical firms produce widgets and that they are the only firms in the...
Suppose that two identical firms produce widgets and that they are the only firms in the market. Their costs are given by C1=60Q1 and C2=60Q2 where Q1 is the output of Firm 1 and Q2 is the output of Firm 2. Price is determined by the following demand curve: P=2700−Q where Q=Q1+Q2 Find the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Calculate the profit of each firm at this equilibrium. (For all of the following, enter a numeric response rounded to two decimal places.) When...
Suppose that two identical firms are selling a product and that they are the only firms...
Suppose that two identical firms are selling a product and that they are the only firms in the market. Total costs are Ci = 20Qi for each firm. The market demand curve is P = 80 – 0.5Q where Q = Q1 + Q2. The Cournot model describes the competition in this market. Using the above information, complete the below statements, a.)If these two firms collude, their combined output is equal to b.)If these two firms collude, each firm’s output...
Suppose there are only two firms in the market, firm 1 and firm 2. They produce...
Suppose there are only two firms in the market, firm 1 and firm 2. They produce identical products. Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost where AC1 =MC1 =20, and firm 2 has a constant marginal cost AC2 =MC2 =8. The market demand function is given by Q = 100 - 0.5P. a) Find the Cournot Nash Equilibrium price and quantity, write down the profits for each firm. (Use "q1" to represent output level for firm 1, and "profit1" to...
Suppose that there are two industries, A and B. There are five firms in industry A...
Suppose that there are two industries, A and B. There are five firms in industry A with sales at $5 million, $2 million, $1 million, $1 million, and $1 million, respectively. There are four firms in industry B with equal sales of $2.5 million for each firm. The four-firm concentration ratio for industry A is: A. 0.9. B. 1.0. C. 0.8. D. 0.7. I don't understand why the answer is 0.9 can someone explain to me.
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT