Question

In: Economics

Suppose that there are two industries, A and B. There are five firms in industry A...

Suppose that there are two industries, A and B. There are five firms in industry A with sales at $5 million, $2 million, $1 million, $1 million, and $1 million, respectively. There are four firms in industry B with equal sales of $2.5 million for each firm. The four-firm concentration ratio for industry A is:

A. 0.9.
B. 1.0.
C. 0.8.
D. 0.7.

I don't understand why the answer is 0.9 can someone explain to me.

Solutions

Expert Solution

Concentration Ratio

Concentration ratios are used to determine the market structure and competitiveness of the market. The concentration ratio indicates whether an industry is comprised of a few large firms or many small firms.

Now the four-firm concentration ratio is the ratio of the four largest firms sales to the total sales of all the firms in the industry.

Four-Firm concentration ratio = Four largest firms in respect of sales / Total Sales

In the above question, there are five firms in industry A with sales at $5 million, $2 million, $1 million, $1 million, and $1 million, respectively.

So four largest firms are $5, $2, $1, $1 because they are highest among all five

Four-Firm concentration ratio = Four largest firms in respect of sales / Total Sales

Four-Firm concentration ratio = (5 + 2 + 1 + 1) / (5 + 2 + 1 + 1 + 1)

Four-Firm concentration ratio = 9 / 10

Four-Firm concentration ratio = 0.9 or 90%

We can also calculate by adding each share with respect to total sales of four largest firms

As four largest firms are $5, $2, $1, $1 because they are highest among all five

5 / 10 = 0.5

2 / 10 = 0.2

1 / 10 = 0.1

1 / 10 = 0.1

Adding all

0.5 + 0.2 + 0.1 + 0.1 = 0.9

Four-Firm concentration ratio = 0.9  


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