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The market demand is Q=120-P, there are two firms on the market that engage in Stackelber...

The market demand is Q=120-P, there are two firms on the market that engage in Stackelber competition. Both firms have MC=0 and FC=0. How much more profit does Stackelber leader made compared to Cournot?

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Rahul Sunny answered 7 months ago
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