In: Economics
Hint: use a graph to answer each question.(hints to the problem are given below)
First, set the problem up.
Expected wealth = E(W) = W0– pF; if we double pthen E(W) = W0– 2pF
If we double Fthen E(W) = W0– p2F. Thus E(W)is the same. The best deterrent is the option that results in the lowest expected utility.
Let us examine the situation.
Let U(x) be the utility function of the theives, where x = wealth of theives
1) If we double the fine, then expected utlity E(U) = U(W)* Probability of not being caught + U(W-2F) * Probability of being caught
E(U) = U(W)*(1-p) + U(W-2F)*p = E1
2) If we double the probabilty, then expected utility
E(U) = U(W)*(1-2p) + U(W-F)*2p = E2
For a risk averse person, marginal utility is positive but diminishing.
Hence for a risk averse person, E1 < E2, hence doubling the fine is the best policy for a risk averse thief.
For a risk loving person, marginal utility is positive and increasing
Hence for a risk loving person, E2 < E1, hence doubling the probability if the best policy for a risk loving thief.
We can use utility function of U(x) = x0.5 for a risk averse person and U(x) = x2 for a risk loving person and compare values of E1 and E2 and we can confirm that we get the best result.