Question

A male employee was hired by a company with more than 15 employees. Approximately one year into the employment the employee told his supervisor that he was a transsexual and came dressed to a party as a woman. The employee then announced he would be transitioning from a male to a female. This meant she would be coming to the office dressed as a woman and would legally adopt a female name. Following this announcement the employee was terminated. The employee sued claiming discrimination against her on the basis of her sex, including both her gender identity and her failure to conform to the male sex stereotype (i.e., behave and dress in "traditional male" ways). Will she prevail in her claim? Why or why not.

Answer 1

Sex or gender discrimination in employment involves treating someone unfavorably because of the person’s sex, whether they are applying for a job or are a current employee. Although women have made clear they have the ability to perform with the same skill and success in every endeavor engaged in by men, the issue of sex discrimination still holds many back. Sex discrimination, although predominantly an issue for women, can sometimes be directed towards men as well.Title VII covers all private employers, state and local governments, and educational institutions that employ 15 or more individuals. These laws also cover private and public employment agencies, labor organizations, and joint labor management committees controlling apprenticeship and training.

Many states also make it illegal to discriminate on the basis of sex. For more information, please see our page on the minimum number of employees needed to file a claim under your state law.

The law's protections apply to both current workers and job applicants. If you are a current employee and are fired, not promoted, or not accommodated due to your sex or gender, you are protected. If you are not hired due to your sex or gender, you are also protected.

The law forbids discrimination when it comes to any aspect of employment, including hiring, firing, pay, job assignments, promotions, layoff, training, fringe benefits, and any other term or condition of employment.

It is unlawful to harass a person because of that person's sex. Harassment can include "sexual harassment" or unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical harassment of a sexual nature. Harassment does not have to be of a sexual nature, however, and can include offensive remarks about a person's sex. For example, it is illegal to harass a woman by making offensive comments about women in general.

Both victim and the harasser can be either a woman or a man, and the victim and harasser can be the same sex.

Although the law doesn't prohibit simple teasing, offhand comments, or isolated incidents that are not very serious, harassment is illegal when it is so frequent or severe that it creates a hostile or offensive work environment or when it results in an adverse employment decision (such as the victim being fired or demoted).

The harasser can be the victim's supervisor, a supervisor in another area, a co-worker, or someone who is not an employee of the employer, such as a client or customer.

An employment policy or practice that applies to everyone, regardless of sex, can be illegal if it has a negative impact on the employment of people of a certain sex and is not job-related or necessary to the operation of the business.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a federal law that protects individuals from discrimination based upon sex. This law makes it illegal for an employer to discriminate against individuals in hiring, firing, and other terms and conditions of employment, such as promotions, raises, and other job opportunities because of their.

The answer to this question is in this case that had taken place years ago.

One of the first cases to address efforts to expand the boundaries of sex discrimination under Title VII was a 1984 case involving an Eastern Airlines pilot. He began his service with the airline as Kenneth Ulane, but was fired when he became Karen Ulane. Ulane was a decorated Vietnam War veteran who had flown for Eastern since his discharge from military service in 1968. Ulane had been diagnosed as a transsexual in 1979, and in 1980 underwent sex reassignment surgery. Following the surgery, the State of Illinois issued a revised birth certificate to Ulane indicating that Ulane was female, and the FAA certified her for flight status as a female. Eastern was unaware of Ulane’s transsexuality, her medical treatments or her psychiatric counseling concerning her transsexualism until she attempted to return to work after her sex reassignment surgery. According to Ulane, Eastern terminated her employment for “no reason other than the fact that she ceased being a male and became a female.”

Ulane filed suit against Eastern claiming that her discharge violated Title VII and alleging that she was discriminated against as a female and as a transsexual. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois determined that Ulane had been fired because she was a transsexual and ruled that discrimination against transsexuals violated Title VII. The district court stated that while the use of the term “sex” did not include “sexual preference,” it did include “sexual identity” as “a physiological question — a question of self-perception; and in part a social matter — a question of how society perceives the individual.” The district court concluded that it was reasonable to hold that the word “sex” in Title VII literally and scientifically applied to transsexuals, even if it did not apply to homosexuals or transvestites.

Eastern appealed the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. In nullifying the lower court’s decision, the Seventh Circuit relied on two arguments. First, in considering the addition of the word “sex” to Title VII, the court stated that “Congress never considered nor intended that this 1964 legislation apply to anything other than the traditional concept of sex” and that, following congressional intent, “sex should be given a narrow, traditional interpretation.” In addition, the court noted the numerous legislative attempts to include sexual orientation within Title VII’s protection, all of which had failed. The Seventh Circuit therefore held that Title VII did not include protection for transsexuals and stated further that “if the term ‘sex’ as it is used in Title VII is to mean more than biological male or biological female, the new definition must come from Congress.” The appellate court concluded further that Eastern had not discriminated against Ulane because she was a female, but because she was a transsexual — “a biological male who takes female hormones, cross-dresses, and has surgically altered parts of her body to make it appear to be female.” Therefore, because Title VII did not prohibit discrimination against transsexuals, the trial court’s determination was reversed and the Seventh Circuit entered judgment in favor of Eastern.

Despite the holding in Ulane, the issue of gender-identity protection under Title VII did not fade away, and the U.S. Supreme Court added another facet to the discussion with a 1989 decision concerning “sex stereotyping” under Title VII. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,⁴ a female associate at a national accounting firm had been passed over for partnership. The apparent reasons were her “aggressiveness” and “lack of interpersonal skills.” Some partners described her as “macho” and stated that she “overcompensated for being a woman.” One partner indicated that the plaintiff could have improved her chances of making partner if she would “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”

The Supreme Court stated that it did not “require expertise in psychology to know that, if an employee’s flawed ‘interpersonal skills’ can be corrected by a soft-hued suit or a new shade of lipstick, perhaps it is the employee’s sex and not her interpersonal skills that has drawn the criticism.” The Court, ruling for the plaintiff, stated that Title VII reaches claims of discrimination based on “sex stereotyping,” and that “in the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.” The Court stated further that “we are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group.” Similar to the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Ulane, the Court looked to congressional intent as the basis for its decision. The Court stated that “in forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”

So after reading the laws we can conclude that:

Yes, she will prevail in her claim as the law covers againts the employer who has employees more than 15 and the employee must be in company more than 180 days.