In: Economics
Barnacle Industries was awarded a patent over 15 years ago for a unique industrial strength cleaner that removes barnacles and other particles from the hulls of ships. Thanks to its monopoly position, Barnacle has earned more than $160 million over the past decade. Its customers—spanning the gamut from cruise lines to freighters—use the product because it reduces their fuel bills. The annual (inverse) demand function for Barnacle’s product is given by P = 220 -0.000006Q, and Barnacle’s cost function is given by C(Q) = 200Q. Thanks to subsidies stemming from an energy bill passed by Congress nearly two decades ago, Barnacle does not have any fixed costs: The federal government essentially pays for the plant and capital equipment required to make this energy-saving product.
a. What would Barnacle's profits be if Marge pursues a limit-pricing strategy if the subsidy is in place? $_____
b. What would Barnacle's profits be if Marge convinces the government to eliminate the subsidy? $_____
c. What would be the profit of a new entrant if the subsidy is eliminated and Barnacle continues to produce the monopoly level of output? ______
d. Which strategy is more beneficial to Barnacle? choose from the following i.Eliminating the subsidy and continuing to produce the monopoly output or ii. Limit pricing
Answer A:- First, note that the monopoly price is P =
$385.00, the monopoly output is Q = 700,000, and monopoly
profits are $24,500,000.00. (To see this, note that MR = 420
-0.0001Q and MC = $350, so setting MR = MC and solving yields these
results).
Second, notice that with the subsidy the firm’s average cost curve
is constant at $350 per unit. Thus, to prevent entry via limit
pricing, Barnacle would have to price its product at $350. Doing so
would yield zero profits.
Answer B:- A better strategy for Barnacle is to lobby to eliminate
the $8 million in subsidies while committing to produce its current
(monopoly) level of output. This would reduce Barnacle’s profits to
$16,500,000.00 per year.
Answer C:- However, the (inverse) residual demand curve for
entrants would be P = 385.00 -0.00005Q after Barnacle commits to
the monopoly output. Solving MR = MC yields the entrant producing
350,000, a market price of $367.50, and profits for the entrant of
$-1,875,000.00, making it unprofitable for an entrant to enter the
market.