In: Accounting
Some part of the academic literature has studied the motives behind accounting choice (such as depreciation methods). With reference to Field et al. (2001) briefly outline the main reasons for accounting choice.
Generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) often require
that
judgment be exercised in preparing financial statements.For
example, that
judgment may relate to the amount of accounts receivable that are
likely to be
collected, the appropriate allocation pattern for the cost of
equipment, or how
long a marketable security is likely to be held.
In turn, exercising such judgments provides information to
outsiders when
information asymmetries are present.This is self-evident when the
decision-
maker (e.g., manager) is disinterested and objective, although
issues of
consistency and comparability inevitably arise.Accounting choice
also may be
beneficial because alternative accounting methods may not be
perfect.
he other hand, the same accounting
choices may be motivated by managers’ objective assessment that the
current
stock price is undervalued (relative to their private
information).In practice, it
is difficult to distinguish between these two situations, but it is
the presence of
such mixed motives that makes the study of accounting choice
interesting.
Because of these conflicting motives, contracting parties restrict
the choices
available to decision makers
We adopt the definition of earnings management suggested by Watts
and
Zimmerman (1990) in which they describe earnings management as
occurring
when managers exercise their discretion over the accounting numbers
with or
without restrictions.Such discretion can be either firm value
maximizing or
opportunistic.7 Rational managers would not engage in earnings
management
in the absence of expected benefits implying that managers do not
believe that
information markets are perfect.In order for earnings management to
be
successful the perceived frictions must exist and at least some
users of
accounting information must be either unable or unwilling to
unravel
completely the effects of the earnings management.
By contrast, one can imagine an accounting system that is entirely
rule
based, with no room for judgment.For example, such a system could
specify
that the allowance for uncollectibles is always 10% of receivables,
that
equipment is depreciated straight line over 5 years, and that all
marketable
securities are to be treated as if they were available for
sale.
An obvious problem with a rigid accounting system is
providing
rules for all facts and circumstances.In addition, new situations
arise regularly
(e.g., debt/equity hybrids, securitizations) requiring that new
accounting rules
be devised.In other words, accounting choice likely exists because
it is
impossible, or infeasible, to eliminate it.Accounting flexibility
also mitigates
managers’ attempts to obtain desired accounting results by means
of
(presumably costly) real decisions.Thus, the choice may be part of
an optimal
solution to an agency problem, even when it does not convey
information.
Finally, specific choices made can be informative, as suggested
above, and such
information is lost when the accounting system does not provide for
judgment.