Question

On August 23, 2007, the Miss Katie, a commercial fish- ing boat, was six days into an expedition in the Gulf of Mexico. Her crew numbered three, including Yates, the captain. Engaged in a routine offshore patrol to inspect both recreational and commercial vessels, Officer John Jones of the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission decided to board the Miss Katie to check on the vessel’s compliance with fishing rules. Because he had been deputized as a federal agent by the Nation- al Marine Fisheries Service, Officer Jones had authority to enforce federal, as well as state, fishing laws.

not more than 20 years, or both.”

Yates was convicted but moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that §1519’s reference to “tangible object” means objects used to store information, such as computer hard drives, not fish. The District Court denied Yates’s motion, and a jury found him guilty. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, concluding that §1519 applies to the destruction or concealment of fish because, as objects having phys- ical form, fish fall within the dictionary definition of “tangible object.” Yates, who was sentenced to 30 days in jail and three years of supervised proba- tion as well as carrying a felony conviction for life, appealed.

Upon boarding the Miss Katie, Officer Jones noticed three red grouper that appeared to be under- sized hanging from a hook on the deck. At the time, federal conservation regulations required immediate release of red grouper less than 20 inches long. Offi- JUdICIaL OpINION cer Jones instructed Yates to keep the undersized fish

segregated from the rest of the catch until the ship returned to port. After Jones departed, Yates instead told a crew member to throw the undersized fish overboard. For this offense, Yates was charged with destroying, concealing, and covering up undersized fish to impede a federal investigation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519:

“Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investi- gation or proper administration of any matter with- in the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States or any case filed under title 11, or in relation to or contemplation of any such matter

GINSBURG, Justice Although dictionary definitions of the words “tangi- ble” and “object” bear consideration in determining the meaning of “tangible object” in §1519, they are not dispositive. Whether a statutory term is unambiguous “is determined [not only] by reference to the language itself, [but also by] the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”

Section 1519’s position within Title 18, Chapter 73, further signals that §1519 was not intended to serve as a cross-the-board ban on the destruction of physical evidence. Congress placed §1519 at the end of Chapter 73 following immediately after pre-existing specialized provisions expressly aimed at corporate fraud and financial audits

The contemporaneous passage of §1512(c)(1), which prohibits a person from “alter[ing], destroy[ing], mutilat[ing], or conceal[ing] a record, document, or other object . . . with the intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceed- ing,” is also instructive.

Use of traditional tools of statutory interpretation to examine markers of congressional intent within the Sarbanes–Oxley Act and §1519 itself thus call for rejec- tion of an aggressive interpretation of “tangible object.”

Having used traditional tools of statutory inter- pretation to examine markers of congressional intent within the Sarbanes–Oxley Act and §1519 itself, we are persuaded that an aggressive interpretation of “tan- gible object” must be rejected. It is highly improbable that Congress would have buried a general spoliation statute covering objects of any and every kind in a provision targeting fraud in financial record-keeping.

Reversed.

ALITO, Justice, Concurring [T]hough the question is close, traditional tools of statutory construction confirm that John Yates has the better of the argument. Three features of 18 U.S.C. § 1519 stand out to me: the statute’s list of nouns, its list of verbs, and its title. Although perhaps none of these features by itself would tip the case in favor of Yates, the three combined do so. Start with the nouns. Sec- tion 1519 refers to “any record, document, or tangible object.”

[T]he term “tangible object” should refer to some- thing similar to records or documents. A fish does not spring to mind—nor does an antelope, a colonial farm- house, a hydrofoil, or an oil derrick. All are “objects” that are “tangible.” But who wouldn’t raise an eyebrow if a neighbor, when asked to identify something similar to a “record” or “document,” said “crocodile”?

for it? The plurality offers a clue when it emphasizes the disproportionate penalties §1519 imposes if the law is read broadly. Section 1519, the plurality objects, would then “expose[ ] individuals to 20-year prison sentences for tampering with any physical object that might have evidentiary value in any federal investiga- tion into any offense.” That brings to the surface the real issue: overcriminalization and excessive punish- ment in the U.S. Code.

Now as to this statute, I think the plurality some- what—though only somewhat—exaggerates the mat- ter. The plurality omits from its description of §1519 the requirement that a person act “knowingly” and with “the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence” federal law enforcement. And in highlighting §1519’s maxi- mum penalty, the plurality glosses over the absence of any prescribed minimum. (Let’s not forget that Yates’s sentence was not 20 years, but 30 days.) Congress presumably enacts laws with high maximums and no minimums when it thinks the prohibited conduct may run the gamut from major to minor. That is assuredly true of acts obstructing justice. Most district judges, as Congress knows, will recognize differences between such cases and prosecutions like this one, and will try to make the punishment fit the crime. Still and all, I tend to think, for the reasons the plurality gives, that §1519 is a bad law—too broad and undifferentiated, with too-high maximum penalties, which give pros- ecutors too much leverage and sentencers too much discretion. And I’d go further: In those ways, §1519 is unfortunately not an outlier, but an emblem of a deeper pathology in the federal criminal code.

But whatever the wisdom or folly of §1519, this Court does not get to rewrite the law. “Resolution of the pros and cons of whether a statute should sweep broadly or narrowly is for Congress.” If judges dis- agree with Congress’s choice, we are perfectly entitled to say so—in lectures, in law review articles, and even in dicta. But we are not entitled to replace the statute Congress enacted with an alternative of our own design.

[My] analysis is influenced by §1519’s title: “Destruction, alteration, or falsification of records in Federal investigations and bankruptcy.” (Emphasis added.) This too points toward filekeeping, not fish. Titles can be useful devices to resolve “‘doubt about the meaning of a statute.’” The title is especially valu- able here because it reinforces what the text’s nouns CaSe QUeStIONS and verbs independently suggest—that no matter how

other statutes might be read, this particular one does not cover every noun in the universe with tangible form.

KAGAN, Justice Dissenting with Justices SCALIA, KENNEDY, AND THOMAS

If none of the traditional tools of statutory interpre- tation can produce today’s result, then what accounts

1. Explain what Mr. Yates did and why. 2. Describe the terms used in the statute at issue and

the history of the statute.

3. Why does the dissent think the majority made the decision it did?

Answer 1

1.Explain what Mr. Yates did and why?

John Yates was the captain of a three-crew commercial fishing vessel “Miss Katie” in August 2007. He and his crew were six days into an expedition in the Gulf of Mexico. Officer John Jones was deputized as a federal agent by the National Marine Fisheries Services, which gave him the authority to enforce federal and state fishing laws.

On boarding Mr. Yates’ ship, Officer Jones noticed three undersized red groupers which violated the federal conservation regulations. At that time, federal regulations immediate release of red grouper less than 20 inches long. Officer Jones, then instructed Yates and his crew to keep the undersized fish aside from the rest of the catch until the ship returns to port.
      Once Office Jones departed, instead of setting the fish aside, Yates told one of his crew members to throw the undersized fish overboard and to replace them with other larger fish. When the vessel returned to port, Officer Jones measured the fish that were set aside and suspected that Yates had disposed off the fish he had originally measured at sea.

Yates was convicted for the offence of throwing the undersized fish overboard and thereby destroying, altering, covering up any record, document or tangible object. Yates then contested his conviction stating that fish are not trapped within the term “tangible object”

2.Describe the term used in the statute at issue and the history of the statute.

For the offense of throwing the undersized fish overboard, Yates was charged with destroying, concealing and covering up undersized fish to impede a federal investigation, in violation of:

18 U.S.C 1519 – Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States or any case filed under title 11, or in relation to or contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.

Section 1519 was enacted as a part of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 116Stat. 745, legislation designed to protect investors and restore trust in financial markets following the collapse of Enron Corporation. The Enron Scandal, publicized in October 2001, led to the bankruptcy of the entire company, leaving over 20,000 employees unemployed. In anticipation of a formal investigation, the staff of Arthur Anderson, Enron’s auditor, were ordered to destroy any documents, hard drives and emails that contain records related to Enron. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was thus enacted to protect investors from the possibility of fraudulent activities by corporation. This act mandates strict reforms to improve financial disclosures from corporations and preventing fraud.

3.Why does the dissent think the majority made the decision it did?
        John Yates was sentenced to 30 days in jail and three years of supervised probation as well as carrying a felony convicted for life by the majority, even though Section 1519’s maximum penalty is 20 years with no minimum. Most district judges will recognize differences between cases like Enron and Yates, and will try to make the punishment “fit the crime”. The dissent feels that whatever the wisdom or folly of Section 1519, the Court does not get to rewrite the law. “Resolution of the pros and cons of whether stature should sweep broadly or narrowly is for Congress.”

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