Question

In: Economics

Consider an industry comprising two firms producing a homogeneous product. The market demand and total cost...

Consider an industry comprising two firms producing a homogeneous product. The market demand and total cost equations are: P=200-2(Q_1+Q_2 ); 〖TC〗_i=4Q_i, where i = 1, 2.

a. What is each firm’s reaction function?

b. What are the market-clearing price, and output and profit of each firm?

Solutions

Expert Solution

P= 200-2Q1 -2Q2

TC of firm 1= TC1 = 4Q1

TC of firm 2= TC2 = 4Q2

a.

Profit of firm 1= Pr1= PQ1 - TC1

Pr1= 200Q1 -2Q12  -2Q2 Q1 -4Q1

Differentiate Pr1 wrt Q1 :

dPr1/dQ1 = 200-4Q1 -2Q2 -4= 0

4Q1 +2Q2 = 196 Equation 1

4Q1 = 196-2Q2

Q1 = (196-2Q2 )/4 Reaction curve of firm 1

Profit of firm 2= Pr2= PQ2 - TC2

Pr2= 200Q2 -2Q22  -2Q2 Q1 -4Q2

Differentiate Pr2 wrt Q2 :

dPr2/dQ2 = 200-4Q2 -2Q1 -4= 0

4Q2 +2Q1 = 196 Equation 2

4Q2 = 196-2Q1

Q2 = (196-2Q1 )/4 Reaction curve of firm 2

b.

For market clearing output solve equation 1 and 2:

Multiply 2 in equation 2 and then subtract equation 1 from it:

8Q2 +4Q1 -4Q1 -2Q2 = 392-196

6Q2 = 196

Q2 = 196/6 Market clearing quantity by firm 2

Use this Q2 =196/6 in reaction curve of firm 1:

Q1 = 196/6 Market clearing quantity by firm 1

P= 200-2Q1 -2Q2 = 200-2(196/6)-2(196/6)= 200-130.67= 69.33 Market clearing price

Pr1= 69.33 x 196/6 - 4(196/6)= 2264.78-130.67= 2134.11

Pr2= 69.33 x 196/6 - 4(196/6)= 2264.78-130.67= 2134.11


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