ERP and Change Management at Nestlé – case study
analysis
Read the case study and answer the questions:
A year after signing a $200 million contract with SAP and more
than $80 million for consulting services and maintenance, HSBC
securities in London, downgraded their recommendation on Nestlé SA
stock. Although the Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) project will
probably provide long-term benefits, the concern was what
short-term effect the project will have on the company. Nestlé
Company’s goal is to build a business as the world’s leading
nutrition, health, and wellness company. The company was founded in
1867 when Henri Nestlé developed the first milk food for infants
and saved the life of a neighbor’s child. Nestlé is headquartered
in Vevey, Switzerland with offices worldwide. Aside from chocolate
and confectionaries, the company is widely known byits major
brands, whichinclude
In the early 1990s, Nestlé was a decentralized company where
each of its brands, such as Carnation® and Friskies®, operated
independently. The brands were unified and reorganized under Nestlé
USA, but the divisions still had geographically dispersed
headquarters and made their own business decisions autonomously.
More- over, a team charged with examining the various systems and
processes throughout the company found many problematic
redundancies. For example, Nestlé USA brands were paying
twenty-nine different prices for vanilla to the same vendor. Jeri
Dunn, vice president and CIO of Nestlé USA, said “Every plant would
buy vanilla from the vendor, and the vendor would just get whatever
it thought it could get. And the reason we couldn’t check is
because every division and every factory got to name vanilla
whatever it wanted to. So you could call it 1234, and it might have
a whole specification behind it, and I might call it 7778. We had
no way of comparing.” Dunn and her team recommended technology
standards and common systems for each brand to follow that would
pro- vide for cost savings and group buying power. Dunn then went
to Switzerland to facilitate the implementation of a common
methodology for Nestlé projects worldwide, but when she returned
stateside two years later as a CIO she found that only a few of her
recommendations were being followed. As Dunn recalls, “My team
could name the standards, but the implementation rollout was at the
whim of the businesses.”
Dunn’s return to the states followed USA chair- man and CEO
Joe Weller’s vision for uniting all of the individual brands into
one tightly integrated company. Reflecting on the company’s
condition, Dunn said “I don’t think they knew how ugly it was. We
had nine different general ledgers and twenty-eight points of
customer entry. We had multiple purchasing systems. We had no clue
how much volume we were doing with a particular vendor because
every factory set up their oven vendor masters and purchased on
their own.” Dunn and a group of managers from finance, supply
chain, distribution, and purchasing formed a key stakeholder team
to study what Nestlé did right and what could be improved upon.
They were given about two hours to present their findings to Joe
Weller and other top executives, but the meeting ended up taking
the whole day.
The blueprint from the stakeholder team included SAP as a
cornerstone project that would take three to five years to
implement. As Dunn points out, “We made it very clear that this
would be a business process reorganization and that you couldn’t do
it without changing the way you did business. There was going to be
pain involved. It was going to be slow process, and this was not a
software project.” Unfortunately, senior management did not take
the key stakeholder team’s recommendation to heart, nor did they
understand the pain it would create. As Dunn said, “They still
thought it was just about software.”
In October, a team of fifty senior business managers and ten
senior IT managers formed a team to carry out the SAP
implementation. The team was responsible for defining a set of
common processes for every division. More specifically, each
divisional function, such as purchasing, manufacturing, inventory,
accounting, and sales, would have to give up their old ways and
start doing things the new Nestlé way. Another team spent eighteen
months reviewing each piece of data in all the divisions in order
to come up with a common data design across the entire business.
For example, vanilla would now be coded as 1234 in every division
so that the SAP system could be customized with uniform business
processes and data. However, the team decided against using SAP’s
supply-chain module, Advanced Planner and Optimizer (APO), because
it was recently released and therefore viewed as too risky.
Instead, the team recommended a supply-chain module called
Manugistics that was developed by an SAP partner.
By March, the team had a project plan in place where Nestlé
would implement five SAP modules: purchasing, financials, sales and
distribution, accounts payable and receivable, and the Manugistics
supply-chain module across every Nestlé division. Implementation
began in July with a deadline of approximately eighteen months. The
deadline was met, but just as many problems were created as were
solved. Before all of the modules were rolled out, there was a
great deal employee resistance. It appears that the problem was
that none of the groups affected by the new system and processes
were represented on the key stakeholder team. Dunn recalls her near
fatal mistake. “We were always surprising [the heads of sales and
the divisions] because we would bring something up to the executive
steering committee that they weren’t privy to.” By the time of the
expected rollout, the project had collapsed into chaos. Workers did
not understand how to use the new system or the new processes. The
divisional managers were just as confused as their employees and
probably even a bit angrier. Dunn’s help desk took 300 calls a day,
and she admits “We were really naive in the respect that these
changes had to be managed.” Subsequently, morale deteriorated and
nobody took an interest in doing things a new way. Turnover reached
a new high of 77 percent. Supply-chain planners were unable and
unwilling to abandon their familiar spread- sheets in favor of the
complex Manugistics system.
Other technical problems began to arise due to the rush to
make the project’s deadline. Integration points between modules
were overlooked. For example, although the purchasing departments
now used common data conventions and followed the same processes,
their systems could not integrate with the financial or sales
groups. The project was stopped in June. A co-project man- ager was
reassigned and Dunn was given full responsibility. In October, Dunn
invited nineteen key stakeholders and business managers to a
three-day offsite retreat. While the retreat started off as a gripe
session, the members eventually made the decision that the project
would have to be started over. The project team had lost sight of
the big picture of how the various components would fit together.
It was decided that the project would begin again with defining the
business requirements before trying to fit the business into a mold
that had to be completed by a predetermined deadline. Perhaps more
importantly, they concluded that they required support from key
divisional managers and that better communication was needed to
tell all the employees when changes were taking place, when, why,
and how. By the following April, the project team had a
well-defined plan to follow. By May, Tom James was hired as
director of process change and was responsible for acting as a
liaison between the project team and the various divisions. James
was shocked by the still poor relationships between the project
team and divisions, so he and Dunn began meeting face to face with
the division managers and started conducting regular surveys better
to understand how the employees were affected by the new systems
and how they were coping with the changes. One difference was Dunn
and the project team would act on what they found. For example, a
rollout of a new co-manufacturing package was delayed six months
because feedback from the users suggested that they would not be
prepared to make the process changes in time. Although this project
took much longer than expected, Dunn is not ashamed of the schedule
overrun or the numerous dead ends. She believes that slow and
steady wins the race, and that the project has already achieved a
significant return on investment, especially in terms of better
demand forecasting. “The old process involved a sales guy giving a
number to the demand planner, who says ‘Those guys don’t know what
the hell they are talking about; I’m going to give them this
number.’ The demand planner turned the number to factory, and
factory said demand planner doesn’t know what the hell he’s talking
about. Then the factory changes that number again.” Now, SAP
provides common databases and processes that allow for demand
forecasts to be more accurate.
Since all of Nestlé USA is using the same data, it can
forecast down to the distribution center level. Sub- sequently,
inventory levels and redistribution expenses can be reduced. The
company reports that improvements in the supply chain alone have
accounted for a major piece of the $325 million Nestlé has saved by
implementing SAP. Dunn reflects that if she had to do it over
again, she would focus on changing the business processes, get-
ting universal buy-in, and then and only then installing SAP. As
she said, “If you try to do it with a system first, you will have
an installation, not an implementation. And there is a big
difference between installing software and implementing a
solution.
+ Abstract
+ Context and Background Information
+ Identification of the Main Issues/ Problems
+ Analysis of the Issues