In: Economics
Seclusion BaySeclusion Bay has twocar wash companiescar wash companies?, one owned byCheriCheri and the other owned byLeonLeon. Suppose thatCheriCheri andLeonLeon have two? strategies: to? collude, fix the monopoly? price, and limit the number ofcar washescar washes?, or to break the?collusion, cut the? price, and produce morecar washescar washes. ?? The table gives the payoff matrix? (in dollars) for the game thatCheriCheri andLeonLeon play. |
|
If this game is played just? once, the Nash equilibrium is that ? ______.
A.
both
CheriCheri
and
LeonLeon
break the collusion
B.
CheriCheri
colludes and
LeonLeon
breaks the collusion
C.
CheriCheri
and
LeonLeon
either collude or break the collusion but we? don't know for sure
D.
both
CheriCheri
and
LeonLeon
collude
E.
CheriCheri
breaks the collusion and
LeonLeon
colludes
The people of
Seclusion BaySeclusion Bay
receive the efficient quantity of
car washescar washes
from
CheriCheri
and
LeonLeon.
A.
True
B.
False
A. both LeonLeon and PeriPeri break the
collusion
If LeonLeon strategy is to collude then CheriCheri's best response
is to Don't collude (36.0036.00).
If LeonLeon strategy is to don't collude then CheriCheri's best
response is to Don't collude (0).
If CheriCheri's strategy is to collude then LeonLeon's best
response is to Don't collude (36.0036.00).
If CheriCheri's strategy is to don't collude then LeonLeon's best
response is to Don't collude (0).
So, nash equilibrium of the game is both LeonLeon and PeriPeri
break the collusion as best response of both companies occur
simultaneously when they don't collude.
A. both LeonLeon and PeriPeri break the
collusion
It gives payoff (0,0)
False
(Nash equilibrium of the game is (0,0). But they both will be
better off when they both choose to collude as payoffs of both of
them would increase to (22.5022.50, 22.5022.50) which implies both
can be made better off without making anyone worse off. So, the
nash equilibrium is not the efficient quantity of car
washes).